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The new Act on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, enacted by Parliament and effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary
objective of the Bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an inflation targeting system, the
Bank seeks to attain price stability by implementing a gradual, but firm disinflation programme over the course of sev-
eral years.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, carries out a comprehensive
review of the expected development of inflation once every three months, in order to establish the monetary condi-
tions that are consistent with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration
of a wide range of viewpoints. Those viewpoints include an assessment of prospective economic developments, the
inflation outlook, money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance transparency, the
Bank publishes all the information available at the time of making its monetary policy decisions. The Quarterly Report
on Inflation presents the forecasts prepared by the Economics Department for the anticipated developments in infla-
tion and the macroeconomic events underlying the forecast.
Starting from the November 2003 issue, the Quarterly Report on Inflation focusses more clearly on the MNB staff’s
expert analysis of expected inflation developments and the related macroeconomic events. The forecasts and distribu-
tion of uncertainties surrounding the forecasts reflect the expert opinion of the Economics Department. The forecasts
of the Economics Department continue to be based on certain assumptions. Hence, in producing its forecast, the
Economics Department assumes an unchanged monetary policy stance. In respect of economic variables exogenous
to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the Report are applied.
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Starting from this issue, the Quarterly Report on Inflation rests more clearly on the
expert analyses and forecast prepared by the Bank. The Statement of the Monetary
Council will no longer form an integral part of the Report. The central projections for
real economic developments and inflation as well as the uncertainties surrounding
the forecast (including the inflation fan chart) reflect the views of the Economics
Department. Our forecasts continue to be based on assumptions: we assume an
unchanged monetary policy stance (unchanged exchange rate and official interest
rates), as in previous Inflation Reports. In respect of economic variables exogenous to
monetary policy (the euro/dollar exchange rate, oil prices, certain regulated prices,
etc.), the forecasting rules used in previous Reports are applied.
The trend of disinflation reversed in the third quarter of 2003. This reversal was
reflected in virtually all items of the consumer price index relevant for monetary poli-
cy, including tradables, market services, and processed foods. In respect of items
exogenous to monetary policy, a number of contradictory trends were seen. While
the above-average increase in regulated prices raised the index, the development of
prices for motor fuel, market energy and unprocessed foods was a factor reducing
the index, although only temporarily. According to the most recent data for
October, unprocessed food prices have increased strongly.
This interruption of the disinflation trend can be ascribed to a combination of fac-
tors. First, on the cost side growth in unit labour costs did not weaken, but rather
increased slightly, as the hitherto fore slow wage adjustment by firms stopped.
Second, household consumption expenditure continued to increase, albeit at a
slower rate, exerting upward pressure on prices. Third, the substantial depreciation
of the forint’s nominal exchange rate in the summer may have contributed signifi-
cantly to higher inflation in tradables prices.
Finally, an increase in inflation expectations may also have been a factor behind the
rise in inflation, probably due in part to the nominal exchange rate depreciation in
the summer, as noted, and in part to the fiscal measures expected for next year. 
In our current forecast, under the current conditions consumer price inflation rises
strongly up to mid-2004, remaining above 6% for the most part of the year. Next
year’s changes to the taxation system, driven by fiscal policy, are the primary factor
behind this development. This is reflected by the fact that, eliminating the direct
impact of fiscal policy, net inflation indicators remain practically stable over the
entire forecast period.
Although next year’s increase in inflation will be dominated mainly by fiscal policy
measures, market price inflation is not expected to decline significantly either. The
assumption of an exchange rate for the forint which is weaker than in 2002 and the
first half of 2003, coupled with the very slow decline in private sector wage inflation,
will also impede the resumption of disinflation. 
In the central projection, consumer price inflation stands at 5.1% in December 2003
and 5.9% at end-2004. This is slightly lower and slightly higher than the forecast pub-
lished in the August Report for 2003 and 2004, respectively.
Our current forecast for 2003 year-end inflation would have been considerably
lower, due to the low CPI figures for the third quarter and the short-term impact of
Changes in the structure
of the Report 
Downward trend of inflation
reversed in 2003 H2
Minimal changes in the
inflation forecast
compared to the August
Report
Inflation will continue to
rise next year
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the stronger exchange rate assumption. In October, however, there was an surpris-
ingly strong rise in unprocessed food prices, which had been expected but occurred
with somewhat of a delay. Hence, on the whole our forecast for December 2003
was reduced only marginally.
The increase in the inflation forecast for 2004 can be ascribed to the fact that the
roughly 3% stronger exchange rate (compared to the assumption in the August
Inflation Report) was insufficient to offset the projected growth in domestic demand
(now forecast to be stronger than previously assumed) and the greater-than-expect-
ed inflationary impact of political measures related to indirect taxation. The effect of
changes in indirect taxes caused an approximately 0.5 percentage point increase in
the inflation projection for end-2004. 
Inflation may quickly drop below 5% in early 2005, as the price index will no longer
reflect the one-off price impact of higher VAT. This is based on the assumption that
next year’s high rate of inflation will not be built into inflation expectations.
Thereafter, inflation is expected to slowly decrease in the course of 2005, reaching
4.0% by the end of the year as a result of a combination of various factors.
First, unit labour cost growth in the private sector will slow, while growth in house-
hold consumption expenditure will hardly rise at all. As our assumption calls for a
constant nominal exchange rate, its impact will be felt indirectly through the labour
market (lower wage increases) rather than directly. Other factors exogenous to
monetary policy also appear to reinforce a continuation of disinflation: oil price
futures are falling, and over the long run accession to the EU may reduce inflation
in unprocessed foods. 
The central projection is surrounded by significant risks. The uncertainties are dis-
tributed symmetrically in 2004, while the balance of risks is weighted to the upside
in 2005. The risks to the central projection in 2004 results from two main factors.
First, the effect of the rise in indirect taxes which is seen to increase inflation expec-
tations and second, the impact of EU accession on food and tradables prices, which
is seen as a downside risk.
With regard to 2005, the uncertainty mainly reflects the upside risk associated with
inflation expectations. After several decades of high inflation in Hungary there is a
significant risk that the assumption underlying the central projection, namely that the
additional increase in prices stemming from the rise in indirect tax in 2004 will not
have an impact on inflation and wage inflation, will prove incorrect, i.e. that inflation
expectations will indeed grow stronger. This would contribute to inflation in 2005,
both directly through prices of products, and indirectly through developments in
wage growth. 
In respect of the probability of meeting the previously announced targets, inflation
at end-2004 will almost certainly be above the upper limit of the target band, as
even the central projection exceeds it considerably. The probability of inflation ris-
ing above the upper limit of the target band at end-2005 is also very significant.
However, this is explained by the upside risks, as the central projection for end-2005
coincides with the target.
Disinflation may continue
in 2005, if the 2004 tax
hikes do not boost inflation
expectations
Upward risks to inflation
are significant in 2005 
Inflation fan chart
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Economic growth is estimated to be 2.9% in 2003. According to our forecast for
2004, growth in domestic demand slows, but overall economic growth picks up to
3.2%, associated with a recovery in external demand. This Report presents our first
forecast for 2005, in which economic growth is projected at 3.6%, assuming con-
tinuation of the fiscal adjustment programme.
Our forecast for growth reflects the combined effect of several factors. The size of
Hungary’s export markets paints a different picture than in the August Report—exter-
nal demand is lower, due to a revision of earlier data. This revision has had a nega-
tive effect on our forecast for both whole-economy exports and manufacturing
investment. Nevertheless, the assumptions for external demand and output reflect
our view that the global economic cycle may have passed through its trough. The
chances for a recovery in external demand in 2003 are now favourable—economic
conditions are expected to be stable over the medium term.
By contrast, our forecast calls for domestic demand to grow somewhat more slow-
ly than in previous years, due to the fiscal adjustment and the resulting modest
increase in consumption. Each of the factors noted above increases the likelihood
of higher net exports relative to this year. Despite the slower increase in exports than
observed under the economic conditions in the mid-1990s, Hungary will be able to
increase its market share, although the extent of this increase will likely be consid-
erably more modest than in the past.
Our forecast projects the fiscal contraction of demand to continue in 2003–2005,
the extent of which will be practically identical to that expected in the August
Report. However, fiscal contraction of demand in 2004 will occur in a different pat-
tern than previously postulated, which will increase the projected rate of economic
growth. This is due to the fact that, based on the draft Budget submitted to
Parliament, the fiscal policy stance vis-à-vis the household sector will be more lax
compared to earlier information, which will be offset by a stronger increase in indi-
rect taxes.
The contractionary impact of fiscal policy on demand is expected to take a different
structure in the individual years. Fiscal policy will likely contract demand in part
through higher taxes and in part through lower current expenditures, while govern-
ment fixed investment is expected to continue. Based on the Government’s Pre-
accession Economic Program (PEP), we assume the restriction to be proportionate-
ly distributed between current and capital expenditures in 2005. 
Our forecast for fixed capital formation has only been slightly altered compared to
the August Report. Over the short term, the forecast for manufacturing investment
has been revised down, reflecting greater uncertainty. The forecast for corporate
Economic activity to pick
up gradually
Fiscal consolidation 
continues
Corporate investment picks
up, while household and
public investment slows
Fan chart of the inflation projection
Per cent
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
20
02
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
03
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
04
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
05
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
10 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
SUMMARY
sector investment, on the other hand, has remained essentially unchanged. Over the
medium term, the lower level of external demand and a higher real exchange rate
path relative to the August assumption will likely restrain growth in business sector
investment. However, the most recent decline in uncertainty surrounding external
demand reduces the risks to the projection for fixed investment.
Next year’s fiscal adjustment may affect household income and subsidies on housing
loans equally; we therefore do not expect dwelling investment to increase further.
According to actual data for 2003 H1, government investment was lower than previ-
ously forecast, and consequently we have lowered our forecast for the year as a
whole. Fiscal adjustment affects fixed investment more strongly in 2004 than assumed
in the August Report, and therefore the forecast for the coming year has also been
reduced, although we still expect positive growth in public investment next year. 
Consumption expenditure growth slows gradually at the forecast horizon. The
underlying reason for this is that slow economic growth and the unfavourable devel-
opment of household expectations are the dominant factors in 2003, while the
effect of fiscal adjustment is considerable in 2004. Consumption expenditure may
pick up slightly in 2005, due to a rise in private wages and the assumed unchanged
direct tax burden. 
In the light of actual inventory stock data for Q2, the question remains unanswered as
to whether the figures reflect a cyclical upturn or other developments. The picture of
business activity painted by output data and forecast would be consistent with an
increase in purchased stocks, while the level of finished goods stocks would be declin-
ing. By contrast, half of the robust rise in manufacturing inventories was contributed
by the increase in finished goods inventories, according to the most recent data. 
Hungary’s slightly deteriorating competitiveness, which is due to weaker-than-fore-
cast external demand and the stronger-than-expected real exchange rate, restricts
the opportunities for a medium-term expansion of manufacturing output. By con-
trast, manufacturing output and value added both rise robustly towards the end of
the forecast period.
The slowdown in consumption expenditure growth and the lower path of external
demand relative to the earlier assumption both are reflected strongly in market
services value added. Consequently, the increase in market services value added
will likely be more modest than in previous years. 
In 2003 Q3, the labour market continued to show few signs of effective adjustment
of private sector wages to disinflation, expected since end-2001. Instead, short-term
trends indicate a reversal of the earlier tentative adjustment process—the fall in wage
inflation stalled in manufacturing, with the index edging up slowly in market servic-
es. The slow rate of nominal wage adjustment can be explained both by robust
domestic demand and the higher inflation expectations seen since the middle of the
year. However, all this does not mean a complete absence of corporate adjustment
in manufacturing: firms continued to adjust by slowing the utilisation of labour, i.e.
reducing the number of hours worked and laying off staff. 
Although there have been significant negative shocks to economic activity—the
external slowdown, increases in the minimum wage and strong real appreciation—
the unemployment rate has only increased by a modest 0.5 percentage points over
the last two years in Hungary.
Moreover, according to evidence from the latest data the rising trend in unemploy-
ment broke off in early 2003, with the rate falling slightly in Q2-Q3. This trend rever-
sal was caused by an increase in employment, which was due to the dynamic rise
in the numbers employed in market services and the government sector.
Household consumption
slows down further
Conflicting developments
in inventories
Prospects for output
Slow nominal wage
adjustment to lower 
inflation
Uncertainty in labour
demand prospects
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However, for a number of reasons it is difficult to determine whether the expansion
of employment is lasting or not, and whether the decline in unemployment will con-
tinue in the coming quarters. First, other information available on labour demand
(mass redundancies, unfilled positions) provides no clear evidence of a recovery in
the stagnant private sector labour market. Second, we assume that the drop in gov-
ernment sector demand for labour, envisaged in next year’s Budget, may counter
any further increase in employment. 
We assume that this year’s slowdown in nominal wage adjustment in the private sec-
tor is transient. Wage inflation is expected to moderate from 2004. Assuming that
the increases in indirect taxes do not lead to higher inflation expectations, the grad-
ual decline in wage inflation should continue in 2005.
In respect of manufacturing, we expect the earlier process of slow nominal adjust-
ment to continue, despite the pick-up in external economic conditions, making it
possible for the sector to improve its profitability, which has suffered since 2000. In
respect of market services, we expect the impact of increases in the national mini-
mum wage implemented over the past two years to gradually taper off.
Simultaneously, consumption demand (which will be considerably weaker com-
pared to previous years) leads to a slowdown in productivity growth. In our forecast,
the combination of these factors will prevent firms from relaxing their wage policies.
Consequently, wage inflation in market services is projected to stagnate and decline
slowly from 2004.
On the whole, in our central projection private sector wage inflation will be 9.2% in
2003, 8.3% in 2004 and 6.5% in 2005. There is however a significant risk of higher-
than-projected wage growth towards the end of the forecast horizon due to the risk
of increasing inflation expectations. 
Measured on the basis of manufacturing ULC, domestic firms’ competitiveness has
improved in 2003. However, this has essentially resulted from the nominal depreci-
ation of the exchange rate relative to 2002, while domestic unit wage costs have
actually risen faster than in Hungary’s competitors. Assuming a constant nominal
exchange rate, we expect a slight real depreciation of the exchange rate in 2004, as
a result of a slowdown in manufacturing wage inflation and stable growth in pro-
ductivity. In 2005, the rate of increase in wage costs is forecast to be broadly the
same as in Hungary’s competitors, and thus the real exchange rate remains stable. 
Hungary’s external balance deteriorated markedly during 2002–2003, with the cur-
rent account deficit nearly doubling as a ratio of GDP. The main factor behind this
development was fiscal expansion, which directly implied a deterioration of the pub-
lic sector net borrowing requirement and indirectly contributed to the drop in
households’ net savings. In 2001–2002, this trend was still offset by the corporate
sector lowering its external borrowing due to declining investments.
The slight improvement in the position of general government has lowered the
external financing requirement of the national economy in 2003. However, house-
holds’ net savings continued to fall precipitously on account of the fiscal measures.
Simultaneously with this, and in conjunction with the external business cycle, the
corporate sector’s demand for fixed capital formation has increased. These factors
resulted in a deterioration in the external balance in 2003.
Our forecast is for the general government borrowing requirement to fall further in
2004–2005, reflecting our assumption on the fiscal policy stance. However, the
financing capacity of the private sector also continues to fall, as a combination of a
pick-up in corporate investment and an increase in the net lending of households.
This is because, resulting from its structure, the 2004–2005 fiscal contraction of
demand contributes to the increase in household sector financing capacity. As the
Wage inflation may slow
gradually
Improving productivity
boosts corporate 
competitiveness 
External balance expected
to improve with fiscal
consolidation
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deterioration in the private sector’s position will be smaller than the fiscal contraction
of demand in 2004–2005, the external financing requirement will fall slightly overall. 
The current forecast examines for the first time the prospects for the current account
balance on the basis of a methodology which includes non-residents’ reinvested
earnings in Hungary. Although as an effect of this methodology, which will be effec-
tive from 2004, the current account deficit will be higher by some 2% of GDP, this
will be financed automatically, given that reinvested earnings raise foreign direct
investment as well.
The gradual disappearance of deflation risks and the improving outlook for eco-
nomic activity dominated international capital market events in 2003 Q3. Yields
began to rise on international bond markets as early as the summer. Shares prices
in Europe responded particularly optimistically to news suggesting an end to stag-
nation. Currently, market participants expect the ECB to raise its key policy rate by
around one-half per cent in the coming six months.
Global indicators of risk showed investors’ increasing willingness to take on risks, and
required yields fell globally. By contrast, the fiscal problems facing the accession coun-
tries, particularly Poland, the likely postponement of entry into ERM II and EMU as well
as the Yukos affair all influenced investor sentiment negatively in Central and Eastern
Europe. Hungary’s risk perception also suffered, which can be interpreted as a response
to signs suggesting the country’s increasing external and domestic imbalance. 
In the period August–October the forint exchange rate was characterised by much
more stability and slow appreciation compared to June–July when it exhibited
greater volatility. However, indicating the fragility of the situation, the indicators of
market uncertainty began rising again in September, and the gradual appreciation
observed from August ended in mid-October. Movements in short-term yields were
influenced basically by expectations related to possible interest rate decisions by the
MNB, which in turn were affected by the Bank’s communications and exchange rate
movements. Turbulence in the bond market at end-October led to massive
exchange rate depreciation and the rapid build-up of expectations of an official rate
increase. The Bank purchased bonds in a quick response to liquidity problems fac-
ing the government securities market. Our open market operations, which were dif-
ferent from the general routine proved successful—yields began to fall and later the
exchange rate reversed its course. However, an official interest rate increase in the
near future is still priced into short-term yields. 
The current account deficit continued to rise in the first two months of the third
quarter, and the outflow of direct investment capital resumed. Purchases by non-res-
idents of government securities financed the deficit throughout most of the period.
The maturity profile of non-residents’ government securities holdings shifted towards
medium-term maturities (2-4 years), resulting in a decrease in the average. The wave
of government securities sales at end-October and early November led to a decline
of some HUF 30 billion in non-resident holdings. 
Long-term government securities yields rose relative to early August; however, this
rise was confined strictly to the wave of sales at end-October and early November.
The yield curve changed little in the preceding period. The portion of the yield rise,
which appears to be lasting, may be traced to the increase in the risk premium
required by investors. The larger part of perceived risks may be linked primarily to
country and region-specific sources, its horizon extending to 2 to 3 years. Presumably,
it is not closely related to expectations of a slight postponement of EMU entry.
Inflation and exchange rate expectations did not materially influence yield move-
ments in the period. 
External balance with
reinvested earnings
included
Rising yields in developed
markets 
Uncertainty in the forint
market
Current account deficit
financing
Rising bond yields
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Summary table of projections
(Percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise indicated)
2002 2003 2004 2005
Actual Projection
data1
Aug. Current Report* Aug. Current Report* Current Report*
CPI
December 4.8 5.2 5.1 5.8 5.9 4.0
Annual average 5.3 4.6 4.6 6.5 6.6 4.2
Economic growth
External demand –0.6 3.9 2.0 – 2.3 – 2.5 4.6 3.0 – 4.5 – 6.0 4.5 – 5.8 – 7.9
Manufacturing value added 2.8 2.3 0.9 – 1.6 – 2.2 5.3 3.9 – 5.2 – 6.2 4.5 – 6.4 – 8.2
Household consumption2 10.5 7.6 7.4 – 7.8 – 8.2 1.0 1.1 – 2.3 – 3.5 1.0 – 2.6 – 4.0
Gross fixed capital formation 7.2 4.3 2.2 – 3.6 – 4.1 4.1 2.3 – 3.9 – 5.4 2.4 – 4.5 – 6.8
Domestic absorption 5.4 5.7 6.0 – 6.6 – 7.2 1.8 1.0 – 2.3 – 4.0 1.5 – 3.0 – 5.0
Exports 3.8 4.0 2.6 – 3.4 – 4.0 7.5 5.9 – 7.5 – 8.8 5.2 – 8.1 – 10.8
Imports 6.1 7.1 7.0 – 8.0 – 9.5 6.0 4.0 – 6.0 – 9.0 4.5 – 7.0 – 10.5
GDP 3.5 3.2 2.7 – 2.9 – 3.0 2.7 2.7 – 3.2 – 3.7 3.0 – 3.6 – 4.2
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 4.0 5.8 6.1 – 6.4 – 6.7 5.2 5.5 – 6.0 – 6.5 4.6 – 5.3 – 6.0
EUR billions 2.8 4.2 4.5 – 4.7 – 4.9 4.0 4.3 – 4.7 – 5.1 4.0 – 4.5 – 5.0
Current account deficit including reinvested earnings
As a percentage of GDP 6.1 n.a. 8.0 – 8.6 – 9.2 n.a. 7.2 – 8.1 – 9.0 6.1 – 7.3 – 8.5
Fiscal stance
Demand impact 4.3 (–0.5) (–0.1)– (–0.4) – (–0.7) (–1.0) 0.4 – (–0.8) – (–1.9) 1.1 – (–0.8)–(–1.9)
Labour market (private sector)3
Wage inflation 12.6 9.3 9.0 – 9.2 – 9.7 8.1 7.8 – 8.3 – 10.8 5.5 – 6.5 – 9.0
Employment (–0.2) 0.0 (–0.3)– 0.0 – (0.2) 0.4 0.3 – 0.7 – 1.3 0.5 – 1.1 – 2.0
ULC-based real exchange rate in manufacturing4
Annual average 9.4 (–0.5) 0.3 – 0.8 – 1.5 (–2.6) (–1.5)– (–1.2) – (–0.2) (–1.5)– (–0.8)– (0.5)
Q4 5.6 (–7.1) (–3.6)– (–3.2) – (–2.7) 0.3 (–1.5)– (–1.3) – (0.0) (–1.0)– (–0.2)– (1.0)
* The central projection is marked in bold, surrounded by the lower and upper limits to the projection. There is a 60% probability that the value
of the variable falls within the range defined by these limits.
1 GDP annual data published by the CSO on October 21, 2003. 
2 Household consumption expenditure 
3 Average for manufacturing and services.
4 Positive values denote appreciation.
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The forecast of MNB compared to other institutions
2003 2004 2005
CPI (December on December, in %)
MNB1 5.1 5.9 4.0
European Commission (October 2003) 4.9 5.1 3.8
Reuters survey (October 2003) 5.1 5.5 3.6
CPI (average annual growth, in %)
MNB1 4.6 6.6 4.2
Consensus Economics (September 2003)2 4.7 5.5 n.a.
European Commission (October 2003) 4.6 6.1 4.1
IMF (September 2003) 4.7 5.5 n.a.
Reuters survey (October 2003) 4.6 6.1 4.1
GDP (annual growth, in %)
MNB1 2.9 3.2 3.6
Consensus Economics (September 2003)2 3.0 3.5 n.a.
The Economist poll (November 2003) 2.6 2.9 n.a.
European Commission (October 2003) 2.9 3.2 3.4
IMF (September 2003) 3.0 3.5 n.a.
Reuters survey (October 2003) 2.9 3.2 n.a.
Current account deficit (EUR billions)
MNB1 4.7 4.7 4.5
Consensus Economics (September 2003)2 4.0 4.0 n.a.
Reuters survey (October 2003) 4.4 4.2 n.a.
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB1 6.4 6.0 5.3
The Economist poll (November 2003) 6.1 5.3 n.a.
European Commission (April 2003) 6.2 6.1 5.8
IMF (September 2003) 5.7 5.4 n.a.
1 MNB forecasts are conditional on certain policy variables (forint exchange rate, interest rate, fiscal policy) and some exogenous variables (US dol-
lar exchange rate, oil prices) and thus cannot be directly compared to other forecasts.
2 Consensus Economics Inc. (London) Based on a survey by “Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts”. The balance of payments forecasts indicated in
the survey are given in US dollars, which the MNB translated using the EUR/USD cross exchange rate prevailing in September 2003.
1 INFLATION

actually started in the previous quarter. This process is
evidently not confined to any specific product range, as
it holds true for every endogenous group falling within
the scope of monetary policy.
In respect of products excluded from the core inflation
indicator, special emphasis should be laid on the tech-
nical impact of the effect of the abolition of the televi-
sion subscription fee no longer being part of the base,
noted earlier, as this factor alone increased the price
index by 0.2 percentage points in July.
The price index for motor fuels, however, decreased. In
the beginning of 2003 Q3 this was due for the most
part to last year’s high base, as rising oil prices calculat-
ed in forint tended to increase petrol prices in that peri-
od. During September and October, however, the
decline in motor fuel prices could already be measured
on a monthly level.
Unprocessed food prices behaved differently in the
period up to September as compared to October. In
2003, after the sharp increase in prices early in the
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1 INFLATION
1
1.1.1 INFLATION IN 2003 Q3
In terms of the consumer price index (CPI), the most sig-
nificant development of the period under review was an
interruption in the declining trend in inflation, which
had been uninterrupted since June 2001, when the
inflation targeting regime was adopted.1 The 4.9% rise
in CPI recorded in October 2003 represents a return to
the high rates characterising the first half of 2002.2
Although certain technical factors (i.e. the base effect)
contributed to the summer rise in inflation, for the most
part the 0.8 percentage point increase in the CPI on the
previous quarter was due to underlying economic
developments relevant to monetary policy.
The quarter-on-quarter core inflation index reflects the
acceleration of inflation especially clearly. Both the offi-
cially quoted Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO)
core index and the index excluding tobacco unambigu-
ously indicate a renewed pick-up in price rises, which
1.1 PAST DEVELOPMENTS
Chart 1-1
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Chart 1-2
Quarterly core inflation
(Annualised and seasonally adjusted quarterly changes)
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1 The October 2003 inflation figure was received upon closing this analysis. The new information is reflected in the analysis of facts (Section 1.1) as well
as the short-term projection (Section 1.2).
2 Prior to October 2003, the last time the CPI reached or exceeded 4.9% was in October 2002 (temporarily) and consistently throughout the first half of 2002.
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year, average unprocessed food prices essentially
declined through until September (disregarding sea-
sonal factors). In October, however, the prices of
unprocessed food products suddenly jumped almost
4% in the space of a single month mainly due to veg-
etable and fruit prices. This phenomenon was
observed throughout the region as well.
Turning to regulated prices, special attention should be
paid to per-minute telephone rates, more specifically
mobile telephone tariffs (included among regulated
prices merely for technical reasons), as sharp market
competition led to price cuts in September. According
to the October statistics, however, this process has
come to an end.
1.1.2 PREVIOUS INFLATION PROJECTION VERSUS
THE ACTUAL RATE
In the August Report we projected a 4.8% rise in the
CPI and core inflation of 4.5% for 2003 Q3. Although
in terms of actual figures the difference from the pro-
jection is insignificant, the two indices changed in oppo-
site directions: while the overall CPI was 0.1 percentage
points lower than projected, core inflation was up by
the same amount.
The major explanatory variables in the projection
changed roughly in keeping with the assumptions of
the August Report. At the same time, the projection
error of core inflation remained within the customary
margin of error, and thus has no implications for the
current projection. Similarly, the higher-than-forecast
CPI for motor fuel is due to the fact that oil prices cal-
culated in forint were higher than assumed on the basis
of our technical rules.
However, the situation is different with regard to the pro-
jections for unprocessed food prices. The reason for the fig-
ures falling short of the projections is that the summer
drought did not immediately drive prices up as was expect-
ed by us as well as other market analysts. This shock, how-
ever, then appeared in the October price index.
Chart 1-3
Changes in the main constituents of core inflation
(Annualised and seasonally adjusted quarterly changes)
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Table 1-1
August projection versus actual inflation
Weight Actual August Diffe- Impact
% Q3 data projec- rence of the
tion diffe-
rence
on over-
all CPI
On a year Percentage points
earlier
Core inflation 68.1 4.6 4.5 –0.1 –0.1
Unprocessed food 6.3 0.1 3.5 3.4 0.2
Motor fuel and
market-priced
energy 6.2 2.9 2.2 –0.7 0.0
Regulated prices 19.4 6.9 7.0 0.1 0.0
CPI 100 4.7 4.8 0.1 0.1
Major assumptions in the August projection
versus actual data for 2003 Q3
August Third-quarter
projection actual data
Wage inflation 
in the private sector 9.1 9.0*
Unit labour cost (ULC) 4.9 5.2*
Household consumption 6.9 7.4*
EUR/HUF exchange rate 264.0 259.7
EUR/USD exchange rate 113.8 112.5
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 28.1 28.5
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 6,517.0 6,581.4
Imported inflation of
tradables** 1.0 0.7
* Estimate.
** Annualised month-on-month growth rate.
Table 1-2
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In this Report, we have raised the projection for end-
2004 inflation to 5.9%, up 0.1 percentage points on the
August Report, while the December 2005 projection is
4.0%. The 2004 projection exceeds the upper limit of
the target band, while the 2005 figure remains in the
middle. One important underlying factor for the pro-
jected disinflation in 2005 is our assumption that the
2004 increase in indirect taxes will not lead to higher
inflation expectations and stronger wage inflation.
We expect inflation to rise sharply until mid-2004,
remaining above 6% for most of next year and then
declining towards year-end. These assumptions are
based on changes governed by fiscal policy. This is sup-
ported by the fact that the net inflation indicators
excluding the direct effects of fiscal policy remain
broadly flat over the entire forecast horizon, if the base
effect caused by the low 2003 Q2 price index is disre-
garded. The direct technical effect of value added tax
(VAT) increase will increase inflation by approximately
1.4 percentage points in 2004. Next year, the increase
in excise duties will steadily push inflation up, driving
the rate up by roughly 0.8 percentage points by year-
end. The rises expected in regulated prices on the basis
of implemented and announced measures will generate
extra inflation primarily in the first half of 2004, but
remain roughly equivalent to the rate of inflation nearly
in the second six months.
Although next year’s rise in inflation is due primarily to
fiscal policy measures, inflation cannot be expected to
decrease even if market processes alone are consid-
1.2 INFLATION PROJECTION
Table 1-3
Central projection for the CPI (On a year earlier, in per cent)
Actual data Projection
Weight- 2003 2004 2005
ed
I. II. III. IV. I. II. III. IV. I. II. III. IV.
Core inflation 68.1 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.7 6.1 6.7 6.4 6.1 5.0 4.4 4.1 4.1
Unprocessed food products 6.3 –0.8 –2.3 0.1 3.4 5.1 7.6 9.4 5.1 2.8 3.4 5.7 6.3
Motor fuel and market energy 4.7 12.5 3.7 2.9 1.8 –0.3 3.3 –0.1 –0.6 –1.5 –1.2 –0.7 –0.3
Regulated prices 19.4 3.0 3.9 6.9 7.5 10.6 9.9 8.7 8.5 4.9 5.0 4.8 5.0
CPI 100.0 4.6 3.9 4.7 5.0 6.5 7.2 6.7 6.1 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.1
Annual average 4.6 6.6 4.2
December 2003 December 2004 December 2005
Core inflation 4.7 5.7 4.0
Unprocessed food products 4.2 4.3 5.1
Motor fuel and market energy 2.9 –0.4 0.4
Regulated prices 7.1 8.8 5.0
CPI 5.1 5.9 4.0
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ered. Disinflation is impeded by the weaker forint
exchange rate (compared to last year’s assumption) and
in the first half of this year, household consumption
growth and the exceedingly slow decrease in private
sector wage inflation. In addition to this, the moderate
price rises recorded in the first half of this year will pro-
vide a low base for next year’s inflation.
After a very slow decline in the second half of 2004,
inflation may suddenly drop below 5% in early 2005, as
the one-off price impact of the VAT increase will drop
out from the price index. Subsequently, inflation is
expected to decline slowly or stagnate in the course of
2005. The reason for this is that in our baseline forecast
the assumption is that next year’s rapid price rises will
not be incorporated into inflation expectations.
1.2.1 SHORT-TERM PROJECTION
Inflation is expected to stand at 5.1% at the end of the
year, and average 5.0% in 2003 Q4. Both figures are
broadly in keeping with our previous projection. In
comparison to the low inflation of the immediately pre-
ceding period (2003 Q3), the anticipated increase in
the CPI is due primarily to a rapid rise in unprocessed
food prices and stagnation in core inflation.
In an annual comparison, core inflation is expected to
remain essentially the same in 2003 Q4 compared to the
preceding two quarters. The reasons for this include two
conflicting developments. While inflation is expected to
rise for the majority of products relevant to monetary
policy, this development may be offset by lower increas-
es in prices of alcoholic beverages and tobacco products.
On the other hand, a stronger rise is anticipated in the
prices of products exogenous to monetary policy. Due
mainly to the summer drought, unprocessed food product
prices may continue to rise during the autumn. Vegetable
and fruit prices, in particular, are expected to increase.
There are several factors behind the higher Q4 inflation
in regulated prices. The most important of these include
rises in rates for electricity, district heating and coach
transport.
1.2.2 LONGER-TERM PROJECTION FOR 2004
Inflation is expected to rise to 5.9% by end-2004. This pro-
jection is 0.1 percentage points higher than in the August
Table 1-4
Differences between the current and the August
projection
(Projections for December in the respective year)
August Current Difference
projection projection (between the
current and 
the August
projection)
2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
Core inflation 5.0 5.5 4.7 5.7 –0.3 0.2
Unprocessed 3.8 6.8 4.2 4.3 0.4 –2.5
food products
Motor fuel 2.2 –1.2 2.9 –0.4 0.7 0.8
and market energy
Regulated prices 7.3 8.6 7.1 8.8 –0.2 0.2
CPI 5.2 5.8 5.1 5.9 –0.1 0.1
Chart 1-4
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* Net inflation indicator (1) presents the CPI excluding the direct
effects of VAT increase. This is directly comparable to the net infla-
tion specified in the August Report. Net inflation indicator (2)
approaches the CPI excluding the direct effects of VAT increase as
well as excise duties. In addition to the above two factors, net infla-
tion indicator (3) also excludes regulated prices.
Table  1-5
Consumer price index and various net indices for
2004*
Q4 2004 2004 yearly average
Consumer
price index 6.1 6.6
Net (1) 4.7 5.2
Net (2) 4.3 4.7
Net (3) 4.1 4.4
* Annual change in per cent.
21QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
1 INFLATION
1
forecast. Our projection for 2004 annual average inflation
has also been raised by 0.1 percentage points, to 6.6%.
The reasons for the upward revision of the 2004 infla-
tion projection include several factors. The assumption
of a stronger forint exchange rate than in August sug-
gests lower inflation, but macroeconomic develop-
ments, the implemented and planned fiscal policy meas-
ures and the draft acts submitted to Parliament may
result in higher aggregate inflation.
Monetary policy (exchange rate) assumption
The forint exchange rate has been stronger in the past
two months than assumed in the August Report. In line
with our forecasting rule, in this projection the average
EUR/HUF 255.5 exchange rate in the month immedi-
ately preceding the closing date of the Report, i.e. in
October, is applied for the entire forecast horizon. This
exchange rate is roughly 3% stronger than assumed in
the previous Report.
A stronger forint exchange rate directly affects the prices
of tradables, in particular durables and certain food prod-
ucts. In our assumption, the stronger exchange rate drives
the overall CPI down by 0.4 percentage points by end-
2004 as compared to the August projection.
Macroeconomic developments
Primarily as a result of the planned personal income tax
(PIT) cuts, household disposable income may be higher
than previously assumed, and this may trigger an accel-
eration in household consumption. Increased aggregate
income may, in turn, be conducive to price rises. Due
to the fact that both the real exchange rate and demand
would be higher than projected in the August Report,
over the next twelve months the inflation differential
between market services and tradables may increase to
exceed the current difference.
In this Report, growth in 2004 unit labour cost through-
out the private sector is virtually the same as projected
in the August Report, but with a different internal struc-
ture. Although growth in manufacturing ULC may be
Table 1-6
Major assumptions in the current and the August Report
August projection Current projection Difference
(between the current 
and the August assumptions)
2003 2004 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004
Wage inflation in the private sector* 9.3 8.1 9.2 8.3 6.5 –0.1 0.2
Unit labour cost* 5.1 3.9 5.2 4.6 3.0 0.1 0.7
Household consumption expenditure* 7.6 1.0 7.8 2.3 2.6 0.3 1.3
EUR/HUF exchange rate** 264.0 264.0 255.5 255.5 255.5 –8.5 –8.5
EUR/USD exchange** 113.8 113.8 116.9 116.9 116.9 3.1 3.1
Brent oil price (USD/barrel)*** 28.1 25.3 28.9 25.5 23.8 0.8 0.2
memo: Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 6517.0 5881.0 6320.9 5572.0 5193.4 –196.1 –309.0
Imported inflation of tradables 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
prices****
* Yearly average. 
** Average for October. 
*** Based on futures prices. 
**** Annualised month-on-month growth rates.
Table 1-7
Decomposition of changes in the CPI projection
for December 2004 against the August report*
Factor Impact 
on the December 2004
inflation assumption 
(percentage point)
HUF exchange assumption –0.40
Household consumption 0.00–0.10
ULC 0.00–0.10
Inflation expectations 0.00–0.10
Macro-economic processes total 0.00–0.10
VAT increase –0.20
Increase in excise duties 0.50
Increase in the producer 
price of natural gas 0.10
Other tax measures 0.10
Regulated goods 0.05
Fiscal measures total 0.55
Other exogenous processes –0.10
Aggregate inflation impacts 0.10
* Approximate calculations; in terms of year-on-year indices.
** Oil price, EUR/USD exchange rate, price development of
unprocessed food products, etc.
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lower than previously assumed, in the field of market
services it is likely to be higher. As domestic wage costs
play a defining role in the inflation of service prices,
ULC growth, which is overall in line with our previous
forecast, but is in a somewhat different structure may
lead to higher inflationary pressures next year.
Ultimately, a rise in inflation expectations may also lead
to an increase in inflation. According to Reuters’ month-
ly survey of analysts, end-2004 inflation expectations
have increased by roughly 1.5 percentage points since
publication of the August Report. Obviously, for the
most part they reflect the one-off price impact of indi-
rect tax increases, but, to a lesser extent, they may also
point to genuine inflation processes. TÁRKI’s quarterly
survey of corporate managers also indicates an increase
in inflation expectations for next year.
In comparison with the August Report, not even the
combined influences of the changes observed or fore-
cast in household consumption, labour market process-
es and inflation expectations can counter the effects of
the stronger exchange rate.
Processes exogenous to monetary policy
As a result of the combined effects of several factors, we
currently project lower annual prices for unprocessed
food products in 2004 relative to the August Report.
Most recent data show that prices in this product group
jumped sharply in October, rising by roughly 4%. For
the most part this is attributed to the delayed results of
the very dry summer. For this reason, we view the
recent steep price rises as merely transient in terms of
longer-term developments.
Moreover, we believe that accession to the European
Union may reduce inflation in unprocessed food
prices. Currently, imports of a number of EU products
are subject to customs tariffs beyond a certain quanti-
tative limit, but upon accession this obligation will be
removed. In addition, Hungary’s alignment with the
European regulatory environmental and support poli-
cies may facilitate convergence of producer prices
over the medium term. This is a factor of major impor-
tance because some key Hungarian food product
prices are higher than average prices prevailing in the
European Union.3
Despite stronger EUR/HUF and EUR/USD exchange
rates, we have raised the projection for inflation in
motor fuel and market energy prices due to rising oil
futures prices.
Fiscal policy
The overall inflationary impact of fiscal policy has
increased moderately compared to the August Report.4
Although our projection of the fiscal demand impact
remains practically unchanged, its internal structure dif-
fers. Thus, household disposable income and consump-
tion demand may be higher than previously assumed. In
2004, fiscal policy will result in inflationary pressure pri-
marily by increasing indirect taxes and the prices of reg-
ulated goods in excess of the rate of inflation.
Pursuant to the relevant draft act submitted to
Parliament, in 2004 significant changes are expected in
value added tax rates as well as the products and servic-
es subject to such tax.5 The lowest VAT tax rate will
increase from 0% to 5%, the preferential rate from 12%
to 15%, while the standard rate will remain 25%. Based
on official information, it was also assumed that the
highest VAT rate (25%) would be applied to electricity,
but that other types of household energy (gas, district
heating, coal, wood, etc.) would continue to be taxed at
the preferential rate (15%) from 2004. In certain
aspects, the draft act deviates from the fiscal policy
plans taken as a basis in the August Report.
As detailed in the previous Report, the impact of tax
changes directly affecting prices can be differentiated
from the indirect primary effects. Upon quantification
3 Decline is expected primarily in milk and dairy product prices. Prices for eggs, potatoes, vegetables, wheat and pork are already approaching the cor-
responding European prices. Major upward price convergence can be expected only in the case of certain fruits. Barnabás Ferenczi, Zoltán M. Jakab,
Nóra Nagy B: ‘Do Food Prices in Hungary Conceal Inflationary Tensions? An analysis on the potential effects of EU entry on food prices’, MNB
Background Studies, 2002/1.
4 The cut-off date for fiscal policy measures was 5 November 2003.
5 Draft Act T/5478 on the amendment of acts on taxes, contributions and other budgetary revenues.
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of the direct impact, producers and merchants were
assumed to completely pass tax increases on to con-
sumers and likewise fully reflect tax cuts in their prices.
The August Report forecast a 1% price rise as a result
of the direct primary impact of the announced VAT
changes. However, in contrast to the original fiscal policy
plans, the draft does not call for a cut in the standard
VAT rate from 25% to 23%. This factor alone raises the
direct impact by roughly 0.8 percentage points. In con-
trast to the original plan, the standard rate has not been
applied in respect of neither passenger transport nor
district heating, reducing the direct impact by nearly
0.4 percentage points. Thus, the direct primary effects
of VAT changes may amount up to 1.4 percentage
points on aggregate.
Nevertheless, it could easily occur that economic agents
only incorporate part of the additional tax burdens and
reductions resulting from taxation changes into their
prices.6 The resulting price changes were referred to as
the indirect primary effect of VAT changes. In the August
Report this effect was anticipated at 0.4%. However, as
compared to the fiscal policy plans, according to the
draft no reductions in VAT rates are to be made.7 This
means that either there is no indirect impact at all or it
will reduce price rises. In our estimation, economic
agents may pass on approximately 80% of VAT rises to
consumers. Consequently, the indirect primary effect of
VAT increase might be around –0.2%.
As a result of the roughly 1.4% direct and –0.2% indi-
rect effect, the aggregate primary impact of VAT
changes may amount to 1.2 percentage points. Thus, in
addition to their general effects on inflation, the statu-
tory changes affecting VAT may increase the overall
price level by this measure. Further eventual pass-
through effects of the one-off price increase, in other
words, the second-order or overall impacts of VAT
changes on the equilibrium are discussed in the section
on the uncertainty factors of the central projection.
According to recent information, excise duties are to be
increased at a higher rate than expected in the August
projection.8 As rates will increase both per thousand cig-
arettes and as a percentage of the retail price, average
excise duties will rise by over 35%. Consequently,
tobacco products may cost over 20% more on aver-
age.9 As the August Report relied on the announced fis-
cal policy plans, it took into account only roughly one-
half of this increase. The additional tax increase will
boost inflation by roughly 0.3 percentage points as
compared to the August forecast.10
Previous projections did not expect an increase in the
excise duty on alcoholic beverages. Based on the bill
submitted, the ensuing price rises have been quantified:
at the CPI level they are expected to amount to 0.1–0.2
percentage points.
The August Report expected, however, a 2.4 forint
reduction in the excise duty on diesel oil. Failure to
implement this reduction may increase our earlier pro-
jection by nearly 0.1 percentage points.
On the whole, the aggregate excise duty hikes in 2004
may boost the CPI by roughly 0.8 percentage points.
This adds 0.5 percentage points to the price increase
projection in the August Report.
As of 15 October 2003, natural gas prices increased by
16.4% on average for non-residential consumers.
Different rates were applied to different consumers:
while certain economic agents pay merely 2% more,
rates for others were increased by up to 40%. In our
view, primarily firms in market services with little or no
foreign competition can pass such increased energy
costs on to their consumers. The average increase in
natural gas prices can be put at 35% in the service sec-
tor. In our model calculations it was assumed that, due
to the increased energy costs, some of the economic
agents affected will raise their consumer prices even
before the end of 2003. On aggregate, an increase in
the consumer price of natural gas may boost the CPI up
by roughly 0.2 percentage points by next autumn, while
Chart 1-6
Decomposition of the total impact of the 2004
VAT changes in the August versus in the current
Report
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6 For excise duty increases, we assumed a complete pass-through.
7 With the exception of books, which have been reclassified from the preferential to the lowest tax bracket.
8 Draft Act T/5478 on the amendment of acts on taxes, contributions and other budgetary revenues.
9 We assumed a stable producer price level, so that there would be full pass-through of excise duty increase.
10 Although the tax increase is effective as of January 2004, it will take time to exhaust stocks, and so new prices are expected to appear in shops only
in March. Moreover, stocks are expected to completely exhaust within about seven months. Consequently, higher prices can show up completely in
price statistics only at the end of autumn, at the earliest.
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the December price index may be 0.1 percentage
points higher.
In the course of 2004, new types of taxes will be intro-
duced, which will result in higher inflationary pressure, in
part indirectly through increases in producer/service
provider prices, and in part directly at the consumer level.
The energy tax will drive piped gas and electricity prices up
in the non-household sector. In our estimation, piped gas
will cost roughly 5% more, while electricity will cost 1.5%
more as of 1 January 2004 for the companies affected.
The system of excise duty will also be reshaped.
Elimination of the excise duty on coffee as of 1 May
2004 could reduce the CPI by as much as 0.1%.
However, we expect merchants and service providers
to apply only part of the tax cuts in their prices.
As of 2004, a registration fee for vehicle commissioning
will replace the excise duty imposed on the purchase of
passenger cars. If the new taxes levied per quantitative
unit are compared with earlier excise duties, it can be
established that introduction of the new registration tax
represents an upward trend in prices. The introduction
of registration tax and energy tax may increase prices
by roughly 0.1 percentage points on aggregate in 2004.
We continue to apply assumptions based on our standard
rule for regulated goods for which we have no official infor-
mation. This means that wherever no solid information is
available on future price changes, the average net inflation
rates of the products and market services concerned, i.e.
approximately 8.5% in 2004, are identical.
The fees charged for sewage, passenger transport and
postal services will, however, increase at a higher rate.
In respect of sewage, the introduction of an environ-
ment fee will primarily affect service providers, who will,
in turn, pass on this extra charge to consumers. We
project an increase of roughly 10% in passenger trans-
port prices. In this respect, the assumption of a moder-
ately higher increase than that resulting from the rule-
based approach is justified by the fact that, according to
the submitted draft, consumer price subsidies will be
cut in certain categories in 2004.11
Lower-than-average rises are expected in the prices of
household piped gas and telephone services. In the
case piped gas, no further increases are assumed in the
projection in addition to the 5.4% rise in the beginning
of 2004, while the sharp competition that has evolved
in the mobile telephone services sector supports the
assumption of a further drop in prices next year.
1.2.3 LONGER-TERM PROJECTION FOR 2005
Our central projection relies on the assumption that the
2004 changes in the VAT and other indirect taxes will
not be reflected in wage and price expectations, as mar-
ket participants will interpret them as a one-off price
rise. If this proves to be the case, inflation is expected to
stand at 4.0% at end-2005, with a 4.2% annual average
in 2005. This would represent a major decline com-
pared to the projections for 2004.
The fiscal policy measures to be taken in 2004 will have
a major base effect. Of the 5.9% inflation expected by
the end of 2004, 1.2% will be attributable to the VAT rise,
and a further 0.4% to the increase in the excise duty, con-
sidered as a one-off rise, in addition to the tax increases
required by EU accession. For this reason, a sharp decline
is expected in the price index in the beginning of 2005,
and the inflation rate may average 4.4 % in 2005 Q1.
In the course of 2005, inflation is expected to fall by a
further 0.3% as a result of several factors. While the
assumed acceleration of household consumption in
2005 as compared to 2004 suggests higher inflation,
exchange rate effects will be more indirect during this
period, manifested in lower wage inflation rather than in
product market channel, as we assume that the nominal
exchange rate remains constant at the October 2003
level. Thus we expect slightly slower growth in labour
costs in 2005, provided that next year’s increases in
indirect taxes do not lead to higher inflation and wage
expectations. In addition to labour market factors, the
assumed contractionary fiscal policy for 2005—based
on the PEP—also facilitates disinflation.
Disinflation is also expected in terms of product groups
exogenous to monetary policy. Our projection for infla-
tion in motor fuels and market energy prices has been
revised downwards as the futures oil prices applied in the
projection fall continuously through 2005. As a result of
Hungary’s accession to the EU, a moderate increase is
anticipated in the prices of unprocessed food products.
Prices of regulated goods are expected to grow more
slowly than in previous years. The fundamental reason
for this is that, in the case of products for which no
official information is available, the same rate of infla-
tion has been assumed for regulated products as for
market services, and this is expected to be lower in
2005 than in 2004.
On aggregate, the macroeconomic outlook, the expected
fiscal policy stance and the processes exogenous to
monetary policy all suggest a decline in inflation in 2005.
11 Draft Act T/5479 on consumer price subsidies.
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The central projection contains significant uncertainties.
In our expert opinion, next year it is more or less equal-
ly probable that the CPI will exceed or remain below the
central projection; while it is clearly more likely that infla-
tion will be higher than the central projection in 2005.
With regard to 2004, the most significant risks sur-
rounding the central projection include the eventual
effect of indirect tax increases on expectations and the
uncertainty involving the disinflationary impact of the
abolition of customs duties upon accession to the EU.
The former risk points towards higher, while the latter
points towards lower inflation. On aggregate, risks are
seen as evenly distributed with regard to the 2004 pro-
jection. This means that the CPI has roughly the same
probability of being higher or lower than the central
projection.
However, the situation in 2005 is different. It is consid-
erably more likely that inflation will exceed the central
projection. This is due primarily to a possible increase in
inflation expectations in the wake of the indirect tax
increases in 2004. Such an increase in inflation expec-
tations would push up inflation directly, through price
rises, and indirectly, through the rate of wage increases.
The significance of the phenomenon is highlighted by
TÁRKI’s business survey, which shows that inflation
expectations already started to increase in mid-2003.
If the contractionary impact of fiscal policy is lower
than assumed in the central projection, this would also
entail a further risk of higher inflation. This risk would
result from the significant difference between the cen-
tral projection for fiscal demand (0.8% contraction as
a proportion of GDP) and the projection relying on
the principle of “unchanged fiscal policy” (1.1%
expansion, see Section 2.1.2). This is because from a
conceptual point of view, the rule-based latter projec-
tion estimates precisely those fiscal policy risks which
are currently not covered by particular measures of
which we are aware.12
12 On the development of rule-based fiscal projections see Section 5.2 in the 2003 August Report.
Chart 1-7
The fan chart* (Inflation on a year earlier)
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Chart 1-8
Inflation perception and expectations of
companies* (Inflation on a year earlier)
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1.3 UNCERTAINTY OF THE CENTRAL PROJECTION
* The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the outcomes
around the central projection of CPI. The entire coloured area covers
90% of all probabilities. The central band covers 30% of the distri-
bution, and contains the central projection (as the mode); outer
bands cover 15% probability each. The points for end-years and the
lines represent the inflation target values and the upper and lower
limits of the ±1% tolerance interval.
* Based on TÁRKI business survey.
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The possible disinflationary impact of EU accession
(resulting from the abolition of customs duties and
keener competition) may slightly reduce the upside
risks for 2005 as explained above.
Analysis of the probabilities of meeting the earlier
announced official inflation targets reveals that end-
2004 inflation is very likely to exceed the upper limit of
the target band, as the central projection is considerably
higher. Higher inflation than the upper limit of the target
band is also highly probable at end-2005. This is, how-
ever, justified by the preponderance of upside risks, as
the central projection for that time frame corresponds
to the target. The likelihood of inflation remaining
below the target is extremely low in 2004 and insignifi-
cant in 2005 as well.
Chart 1-9
Factors influencing the direction of uncertainty in
2005
Expectations
80%
Fiscal policy
10%
EU-accession
10%
Table 1-8
Probabilities of inflation rates outside the target
band
Below the bottom Above the upper
limit of the target limit of the target
band band
End-2004 0% 92%
End-2005 13% 47%
2 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
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We expect economic growth to amount to 2.9% in
2003. In our current projection the rate of growth in
domestic demand drops next year, but economic
growth picks up pace to 3.2%, bolstered by an upswing
in external activity. This issue of the Inflation Report con-
tains our first forecast for 2005, which projects eco-
nomic growth of 3.6% with the assumption that fiscal
adjustment continues.
Compared to the August Report, the forecasted path
of economic growth has changed substantially due to
changes in the available data and the 2004 fiscal path,
which has now taken on a much more definite shape,
as well as changes in other assumptions. One major
difference vis-à-vis the August Report is the projection
of household consumption growth which is now
expected to slow considerably less due to alteration of
the originally planned changes to the tax system. This
is one of the main reasons why the forecast for eco-
nomic growth has been increased to 3.2% in the cur-
rent projection.
There have been changes in a number of the factors
underlying our forecast since the August Report. Of
these, the assumptions for the nominal exchange rate
path and fiscal policy, and for the PIT and VAT rates in
particular, are the factors that have altered the forecast
for economic growth the mostly strongly.
In respect of the fiscal path, the August Report took as
an assumption that the Government’s planned meas-
ures, decided in July 2003, would be implemented next
year. Those measures envisaged a much more severe
restriction of households’ income position. However,
our current forecast reflects next year’s Budget submit-
ted to Parliament for approval. According to the draft,
the fiscal squeeze on household income will be less
intense than previously anticipated, due to the change
to the income tax rates. As a result, in our current fore-
cast for next year household consumption growth
decelerates, but to a lesser degree than assumed in the
August Report.
In addition to the developments noted above, changes
to the forecast have resulted from a number of other
factors as well. Due to a revision of earlier data, the
effective external demand indicator, indicating the size
of Hungary’s export markets, shows a considerably dif-
ferent picture than in the August Report, suggesting
weaker external demand. This revision has affected our
2.1 DEMAND
Table 2-1
Growth in GDP and its components (Percentage changes on a year earlier)
Actual Forecast
2001 2002* 2002** 2003 H1 2003 2004 2005
Household consumption 5.3 8.8 9.4 7.9 7.2 1.7 2.5
Household final cons. expenditure 5.7 10.2 10.5 8.7 7.8 2.3 2.6
Social transfers in kind 3.8 3.0 4.9 4.4 4.0 –1.0 2.0
Public consumption 4.9 1.5 5.0 5.7 4.0 1.5 2.0
Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 5.8 7.2 0.5 3.6 3.9 4.5
'Final domestic sales'*** 4.8 7.3 8.4 6.2 6.0 2.2 2.9
Domestic absorption 1.9 5.1 5.4 6.6 6.6 2.3 3.0
Exports 8.8 3.8 3.8 2.4 3.4 7.5 8.1
Imports 6.1 6.1 6.1 7.5 8.0 6.0 7.0
GDP 3.8 3.3 3.5 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.6
* The original GDP data of the CSO for 2002. Our forecast is based on these figures.
** Revised data published by the CSO on October 21, 2003.
*** Final domestic sales = household consumption + public consumption + gross fixed capital formation.
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forecasts for exports and manufacturing investment.
The relationship between actual export data available
for 2003 and external demand can be better explained
using the revised external demand as a gauge. Our
assessment of effective external demand also reinforces
the view that economic activity has perhaps passed
through the cyclical trough.
The rate of economic growth turned out to be lower in
2003 H1 than forecast in the August Report. In Q2,
growth edged up marginally compared to the previous
quarter, and information which has become available
for Q3 appears to reinforce our earlier view that exports
and industrial output are both rebounding from their
cyclical lows.
Our expectation of this year’s fiscal restriction has
remained unchanged relative to the previous Report.
But, as a result of the fiscal tightening announced by the
Government in the draft budget for 2004, the restriction
will likely be slightly more modest, and also different in
terms of structure, compared to the August forecast. In
2004, the different pattern of fiscal restriction relative to
that forecast earlier will likely add to the expected rate
of economic growth.
In respect of the labour market, from the available data
we can infer that the decline in wage inflation stalled
towards the end of 2002, and that the rate of wage
growth has since stabilised at around 8%. The forecast
for 2004 private sector nominal wages has changed lit-
tle relative to the August Report, but this is translated
into higher net incomes due to the planned changes in
personal income taxes.
The forecast for fixed capital formation has changed lit-
tle compared to the August Report. In the August
Report, corporate investment was forecast to pick up
momentum, underpinned by the recovery of external
demand. This expectation has been reinforced by actu-
al data for H1. In our current forecast, household invest-
ment rises only modestly this year, after growing strong-
ly in 2002. Next year, the fiscal restriction may affect
both household income and subsidies for housing
loans, and therefore we do not expect housing invest-
ment to increase. Based on the outturns for 2003, the
volume of public investment appears to be lower than
previously assumed. Accordingly, we have revised
down our forecast for the year as a whole. The impact
of fiscal restriction on fixed investment is assumed to be
stronger in 2004 than outlined in the August Report, so
the forecast for next year’s investment activity has also
been scaled back.
We have lowered our forecast for 2003 exports
because of new data and weaker growth in Hungary’s
external markets than previously expected, which also
provides explanation for the slow growth in Hungarian
exports in H1. Next year and in 2005 the impact of
increasingly strong external demand raises the growth
rate of exports.
In H1, imports grew faster than previously thought. This
may be explained by the upturn in business activity and
inventory accumulation. We expect this process to con-
tinue in H2 and have therefore raised our forecast for
2003 imports. In 2004, a moderate increase in domes-
tic use reduces the growth rate of imports. Hungarian
imports will likely move on a faster growth path in 2005
as a result of a rapid pick-up in corporate investment,
but net exports will continue to be a factor contributing
to economic growth.
2.1.1 EXTERNAL DEMAND
The likelihood of a recovery in external demand in 2003
H2 is now greater than assumed at the time of the
August Report. Over the medium term, economic activ-
ity is expected to be stable, with smaller and broadly
symmetrical risks. Effective external demand, i.e. the
size of Hungary’s export markets, however, has been
lower due to the revision of past data, and market
expansion in 2003 has been more modest than antici-
pated by the Bank’s staff in August.
Table 2-2
Fixed investment by sector*(Annual percentage changes)
Weights 2001 2002** 2002*** 2003 2004 2005
%
Estimates Forecast
Corporate sector 57 1.0 (–4.6) (–2.1) 2 – 6 3 – 7 4 – 8
General government**** 19 (–6.9) 27.5 29.5 2 – 5 0 – 8 0 – 6
Households 24 21.4 20.0 18 0 – 5 (–5) – 2 (–5) – 0
Whole-economy fixed investment 100 3.2 5.8 7.2 2.0 – 4.0 2.0– 6.0 2.5– 6.5
* On methodology, see Manual on Hungarian Economic Statistics.
** Original GDP data of the CSO for 2002, our forecast is based on these figures.
*** Revised GDP data published by CSO on October 21, 2003.
**** Government spending on motorway construction is included in general government data.
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While the global economic recession probably ended in
early 2002, up to now there have been few signs of a
clear-cut recovery. Modest growth appeared to begin in
2002 H1, but the impact on the price of oil of the Iraq
conflict, which escalated in the second half of last year,
and the difficulties facing numerous large corporations
with high leverage ratio put a brake on these favourable
developments. Concurrently, business sentiment in many
economies also fell to its lowest level in recent years.
In the second half of 2003, the global economy may
move away from the near-stagnant conditions which
have since prevailed. The political tensions with a major
impact on crude oil prices have now abated, and large
corporations have slashed their debt ratios, paving the
way for a revival of economic activity. The U.S. econo-
my has been growing vigorously since 2003 Q2, as evi-
denced by a number of economic indicators. The con-
sequences of this development have now been reflect-
ed in the European business cycle, which is more rele-
vant for the Hungarian economic outlook.13
As was also discussed in the previous Report, Hungary’s
external environment has exhibited a disturbing duality
recently. Whereas economic growth in most of
Hungary’s major trading partners reflected nearly stag-
nant economic activity, the size of Hungary’s export
markets – an indicator better describing movements in
external demand according to our analyses – suggested
a pronounced improvement from 2002 Q2. This was
driven by the robust growth of imports by Germany
accounting for a large share within the indicator. The
gap between the size of Hungary’s export markets and
other indicators describing the external business cycle
(GDP growth, industrial output, etc.) had become
unusually wide by 2003 Q1, adding a great deal of
uncertainty to our short-term forecasts.
As a result of the latest data currently available for 2003
Q2, which show a slight drop in imports by Hungary’s
trading partners, and a substantial negative revision of
data for earlier periods affecting mainly 2002 Q4, the
gap has recently narrowed somewhat. This means that
the size of Hungary’s export markets was much lower
than previously indicated. Thus, the major driving force
behind the weaker-than-expected growth of Hungarian
exports in late 2002 and early 2003 was the lower
weaker external demand than previously thought.
Ultimately, this downward revision of the path of exter-
nal demand implies a longer period of recovery.14
However, no new material information is available
which would affect our earlier forecast over the medium
term, and so quarterly growth rates beyond 2003 will
likely be similar to those provided in the August Report.
Accordingly, annual growth in Hungary’s export markets
this year is expected to be significantly lower, only 2.3%,
due to the data revision noted above. A decline of simi-
lar measure can be derived from changes in the fore-
casts of international economic research institutes.
As was pointed out earlier, we expect quarterly growth
rates to be broadly unchanged with regard to 2004.
Chart 2-1
Projected GDP growth
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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Chart 2-2
Size of Hungary’s export markets*
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* Weighted volume of imports of Hungary’s major trading partners.
13 The major European indicators of business sentiment (the EABCI for the euro area and IFO business climate index for the German economy) have
shown a clear improvement in the past several months.
14 The period of recovery, calculated from the start of recession, is the period required for Hungary’s export markets to recover to the level observed in
the last quarter preceding the start of recession (2000 Q4). It appeared at the time of the Augusts Report that this recovery could be completed by
2003 Q2. However, based on the current correction in levels, the Bank only expects the recovery to finish by 2003 Q4. Consequently, the period of
recovery may be longer by six months.
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Thus, we expect the size of Hungary’s export markets to
grow by 4.5% for the year as a whole, almost the same
as in the forecast in the August Report. Due to the data
revisions and the actual data for 2003 Q2, noted above,
external demand will likely be lower in level throughout
2004 relative to the previous forecast.
Other economic forecasters have also lowered their
assumptions for growth in 2004—their revisions are
typically larger than our. This is a phenomenon that has
been seen in the past as well (see Section 5 in the May
2003 Report).
Our forecast for 2005 is for external demand to grow
evenly, although at a somewhat slower rate than in
2004. That still means that the size of Hungary’s export
markets will increase at a strong rate of 5.8% for the
year as a whole.
Accordingly, the central path is built on a scenario in
which external demand expands at an increasing pace
from 2003 H2. There are, however, uncertainties, as
reflected in rather different assessments of the develop-
ments in Germany. Germany is of crucial importance
for the size of Hungary’s export markets by virtue of the
massive share for which it accounts. In our forecast,
Germany’s imports grow significantly more modestly
compared to the forecasts of international institutions.
Our recent observations suggest that the widely antici-
pated rebound in German GDP will presumably be driv-
en by a strengthening of the components of domestic
demand linked to consumption, rather than by an
upturn in investment. Although German new orders for
manufacturers’ output rose in the previous quarter, they
were strongly volatile prior to this. This is also clearly the
case in respect of a number of other business indicators
forecasting industrial output. Consequently, we expect
German import growth to be only 3–4% in 2004 (in
their latest projections, international forecasters antici-
pate import growth of 5–6%). In our view, German
imports may rise by as much as 5–6% only in 2005
(most international forecasters expect growth in
German imports of around 7% in 2005). Our (implicit)
forecast for German GDP growth differs less from those
of international economic forecasters—the German
economy is forecast in this Report to grow slightly
below the rate anticipated by external forecasters in
2004, and slightly above it in 2005.
As regards Hungary’s total export market, the balance
of risks is weighted to the downside at the beginning of
the forecast period, as growth may turn out to be lower
in the second half (for example, German industrial out-
put fell considerably in August). Over the medium term,
and particularly towards the end of the forecast period,
we anticipate an upside risk to the central projection.
This is consistent with our forecast lagging behind those
of other economic forecasters.
2.1.2 FISCAL STANCE
We expect to see a continued fiscal contraction of
demand in 2003–2005. This will amount to 0.8% of GDP
for each of the next two years as a proportion of GDP,
following this year’s contractionary effect of 0.4%.
The composition of fiscal contraction is likely to be dif-
ferent in the individual years. After the reduction in
investment in 2003, government investment is expect-
ed to pick up, and demand will be restricted by increas-
es in taxes and curtailment of current expenditure. We
assume the fiscal contraction of demand in 2005 to be
proportionately shared by reductions in current and
capital expenditures.
Our forecast for the fiscal contractionary impact on
demand in 2003–2004 has barely changed relative to
the August Report. In August, Bank staff prepared their
forecast on the basis of the proposed budgetary meas-
ures announced in July which envisaged improvement
of the balance in 2003 mainly through the postpone-
ment of certain expenditures and improvement in the
balance in 2004 by raising direct and indirect taxes. The
draft Budget for 2004 and other draft acts on taxes as
well as the likely amendments thereof are significantly
different from the proposed measures announced in
July.15 The latest proposals do not include postpone-
ment of some expenditures scheduled for 2003 (e.g.
Table 2-3
Various forecasts for external demand*
(Average annual percentage growth)
2003 2004 2005
Current Previous Current Previous Current
Forecasts for the growth of Hungary's export market size
MNB 2.3 3.9 4.5 4.6 5.8
EU Commission** 2.5 3.9 5.6 6.4 6.9
IMF*** 3.0 4.4 6.2 6.3 n.a.
Forecasts for the growth in GDP of Hungary's trading partners
MNB 0.5 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.4
EU Commission** 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.2 2.2
IMF*** 0.5 1.0 1.8 2.2 n.a.
* Weighted annual average of import growth of Hungary's 12 main
trading partners in per cent (constant prices).
** Sources: European Commission: Economic Forecasts October
2003/April 2003.
*** IMF World Economic Outlook September 2003/April 2003.
15 We have prepared an estimate of the likely modifications; however, we have decided to restrict the range of those modifications to information which
has become available up to 5 November.
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payment of one extra week of pension benefits, the so-
called ‘53rd week’), and still include the increases in
taxes on households in 2004 (increases in the social
security contribution and indirect taxes); however, the
impact of these measures is mitigated to a degree by
the changes to the personal income tax system.
Consequently, the increase in revenue will be lower,
but the larger reduction in expenditures (corporate
transfers, wages, quasi-fiscal expenditures) may offset
this. The expert projection for 2004 is surrounded by
great uncertainty—the effect of risk factors may reach
1.1%–1.2% of GDP in either direction.
We have also prepared a forecast for the fiscal impact
on demand for 2005. The underlying assumption is that
the fiscal contraction of demand proceeds in parallel
with the deficit reduction envisaged in the PEP.
According to the path laid out in the PEP, the deficit as
a proportion of GDP falls by 1% in 2005, and this is
equivalent to a 0.8% contraction of demand on the
basis of the change in the primary balance. This is
assumed to be implemented through further cuts in
government expenditure.
We have updated our estimate for 2003, reflecting new
information on the expected developments in revenue
and expenditure over the course of the year, an update
of our macroeconomic projection and the Govern-
ments decisions, which have become available.
There are two major changes in our current forecast rela-
tive to the August Report. The result of the modification
of proposed measures announced in July is that the 53rd
week pension payments and the 13th month salaries will
be paid out in 2003, which has added 0.2% of GDP to
the deficit. The upward revision of the forecast for tax
revenue reduces the deficit by 0.1% of GDP.
The year-end, however, continues to carry risks, as the
major part of revenue and expenditure is concentrated
in the final months, in accordance with the seasonal pat-
tern of fiscal developments. Similarly to last year, the
Government may raise additional revenue via income
taxes this year which may not be explained on the basis
of macroeconomic developments. However, the central
projection does not take account of this, given the
extraordinary nature of such additional revenue. It can-
not be ruled out, however, that the implementation of
certain investment projects will continue to lag behind
schedule, as seen in the first half of the year. Expen-
ditures of the local government and the budgetary units,
notably investment spending, are expected to pick up,
reflecting the year-end patterns, and so expenditures
similar to last year’s, or even higher, cannot be ruled
out. The overall impact of these uncertainties may divert
the actual outturns by ±0.3% of GDP from the central
projection.
Preparing our own forecast on the basis of official infor-
mation remains the underlying principle of the forecast
for 2004. The August Report relied on the Govern-
ment’s plans announced on 16 July. In contrast with
this, the starting point for the current forecast is the draft
Budget submitted to Parliament and the likely amend-
ments. In the new forecast, next year’s demand impact
differs only slightly from the 1% contractionary impact
expected in August, although its composition is signifi-
cantly different.
As in the August Report, we have prepared our current
forecast using two different approaches. The rule-based
forecast, prepared as a benchmark, has been altered
considerably (for the details of the principles of the rule-
base approach, see Section 5.2 of the August Report).
The forecast only took account of other determinations
which added to the deficit in August, i.e. prior to sub-
Table 2-4
Current estimate for the 2003 fiscal demand
impact relative to the August Report
(As a per cent of GDP)
Previous central projection –0.5
53rd week pension and 13th Higher than previously
month wage are not postponed +0.2 expected tax revenue –0.1
Current central projection –0.4
Table 2-5
Risks in the central projection for the 2003 demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
Central projection: –0.4% demand impact
Higher contraction of demand Lower contraction of demand
Higher tax revenue at the end of the year –0.2 Additional expenditure by local +0.3
and budgetary units
Slowdown in broadly defined government fixed investment –0.1
Total difference under extreme scenario –0.3 Total difference under extreme scenario +0.3
Demand impact under extreme scenario –0.7 Demand impact under extreme scenario –0.1
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mitting the bill to Parliament. If the draft Budget
approved by the Government and submitted to
Parliament for voting is considered as a legal determi-
nation, then, in the rule-based approach, this version
would more or less ensure a contraction of demand
equal to 1% of GDP, as anticipated in August.
We have built our expert projection, considered as the
central projection, on official information which has
become available. Our previous expert estimate was
based on the partial information announced by the
Government in July and on the major changes released
on the Ministry’s website. The Budget bill submitted to
Parliament has now made available information on the
estimates in full detail, which also reflect the changes to
the draft implemented in July–September. The Govern-
ment made substantial changes to the announced
measures in that period. The effect of the changes to
these plans aimed at reducing the revenue estimates
amounts to approximately 1% of GDP, due chiefly to
the lowering of the income tax rates, the corporate
income tax and the VAT on district heating. Meanwhile,
revenue estimates have been raised by 0.5% GDP,
mainly on account of the withdrawn reduction of the
highest VAT rate. The measures reducing total expendi-
ture have mainly affected Government spending on
wages and corporate transfers.
In addition to these factors, our expert estimate also
takes account of the modifications currently underway,
and likely to be incorporated in the final Budget,16 as
they may bring structural shifts to such an extent that
their impact on inflation is not neutral. Due to our fore-
casting principles, they increase the deficit, if the offset-
ting measures are not detailed. The details of the sav-
ings in the payment of the 13th month salaries and the
increase in the maximum social security contribution
rate are already available. However, the remaining part
reduces the extent of contraction by 0.2% of GDP rela-
tive to the rule-based version; in other words, our expert
forecast relies on not yet finalised but likely measures
(not yet enacted, not detailed, etc.), with a mild expan-
sionary impact on demand.
Our central projection differs from the draft submitted
to Parliament on account of a number of factors:
– The figures for the base year, where they have an
effect for 2004, are based on our own projections.
– In line with our own macroeconomic projection,
next year’s growth in tax revenue is expected to be
lower and pension payments higher based on the
indexation method.
– In line with our forecasting rules, we have ignored
such extra revenue items of the bill that were
linked to planned improvements in the efficiency
of control and tax collection, and enhanced tax
compliance.
– The unspecified measures offsetting the likely modifi-
cations currently underway have been ignored. In the
case of some measures of the draft Budget, where
information is available, for example, in respect of PIT,
we have prepared our own projection.
– Based on the trends of autonomous fiscal develop-
ments, we expect spending overruns in certain open-
ended expenditures and at the local authorities.
Due to the fluctuation of government fixed investment
and changes to the taxation system which effects are
difficult to estimate, the fiscal impact on demand can
only be forecast with higher-than-usual uncertainty.
On balance, uncertainties in macroeconomic develop-
ments result in risks of a stronger contraction of
demand. The nominal growth in the most important tax
bases, for example, those of earnings and purchased
consumption, may turn out to be higher than our fore-
cast, which in turn may result in higher revenues and
slightly more spending on pensions. If the growth in the
tax bases correspond with the rates in our forecast, but
inflation turns out to be higher, then pension payments
would be higher due to the indexation method.
16 We have taken account of information which became available up to 5 November. Reductions in excise duties and VAT (wine, fossil fuels, cinema pic-
tures), the partial withdrawal of the reduction of the consumers’ price subsidy, the reduction in PIT (tax exemption, increase in tax credit, partial with-
drawal of the reduction in subsidies on house loans, taxes on additional incomes will not be raised), the reduction in the corporate tax base and the
increase in subsidies to local authorities have been taken into account as likely modifications. However, we have not taken account of the effect of the
compensation for the increase in the price of electricity, which may amount to 0.2% of GDP.
Table 2-6
Results of the central projection for the 2004
demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
2004 demand impact
Rule-based Expert central Difference in
forecast projection percentage
points
(=expected
measures
based on
proposals)
Previous projection +0.8 –1.0 –1.8
Current projection –1.0 –0.8 +0.2
* Negative values indicate contractionary measures and positive values
indicate expansionary measures.
35QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION
2 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
2
Other measures, the details of which are currently not
specified, may also improve the overall balance and
contract demand further. In addition, information may
become available which would increase quasi-fiscal
items as well.
The envisaged substantial rearrangement of expendi-
tures and restriction may carry the risk that it is not
implemented in full due to autonomous fiscal develop-
ments. Explanation for this is that the local authorities
and the budgetary units may undertake additional
expenditures by stepped-up borrowing or using carry-
forwards.
In 2005, based on the principle of ‘no fiscal policy
change’, the expansionary impact on demand, i.e. the
deterioration in the primary balance, would amount to
1.1%. In contrast to this forecast established on a risk
and rules basis, our expert forecast which uses the PEP
as a starting point calls for a 0.8% contractionary impact
on demand.
Our expert forecast is based on the assumption that the
planned deficit reduction of 1% of GDP in 2005 in the
PEP would take place, implying some 0.8% of GDP
improvement in the primary balance.
This will require measures to be taken by the
Government amounting to 1.9% of GDP in 2005 (as
shown by the difference between the ‘no policy
change’ scenario and the PEP-based baseline). That,
however, is not excessive, as it stands close to our
forecast for 2004 in August and which will be imple-
mented in broad terms according to information cur-
rently available.
In 2005, similar to 2004, EU accession will represent
the most fundamental change, this will have also a
full year effect for the year as a whole. The reduction
in the health contribution rate as planned and the
investment cycle of local government authorities,
which result in increasing expenditures in the years
prior to the elections, are likely to be of smaller
importance.
Overall, we assume the contractionary impact on
demand amounting to 0.8% of GDP to be composed of
a 0.2% reduction in investment spending and a 0.6%
reduction in current expenses, the smaller part of which
being accounted for by a cut in wages and the larger
part by other spending. We do not anticipate an
increase in revenue; moreover, total revenue may, on
balance, even fall based on the measures announced so
far and the concepts outlined in the PEP. (The planned
measures include a further reduction in health contri-
butions and an increase in excise duties due to tax har-
monisation.)
In terms of the composition of the effect on demand,
the direct impact on household disposable income, indi-
rect changes to taxes influencing prices and prospects
for broadly defined public investment deserve special
mention.
We have increased our forecast for government sector
wages and employment relative to the August Report.
That revision reflects the release of the CSO’s data for
August which has become available and the 2004
Budget bill. We have increased our forecast for the
Table 2-7
Risks in the central projection for the 2004 demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
Central projection: –0.8% demand impact
Higher contraction of demand Lower contraction of demand
Tax shortfall in H1 2003 has a temporary nature –0.2 Tax shortfall in H1 2003 has a permanent nature +0.2
Effect of macroeconomic developments –0.4 Effect of macroeconomic developments +0.1
(tax revenue, pension indexation) (tax revenue, pension indexation)
Measures currently not specified –0.4 Lower reduction in quasi–fiscal items +0.4
Smaller offsetting effect of fiscal developments –0.1 Higher offsetting effect of fiscal developments +0.5
(local government) (local government, budgetary units
Total difference under extreme scenario –1.1 Total difference under extreme scenario +1.2
Demand impact under extreme scenario –1.9 Demand impact under extreme scenario +0.4
Table 2-8
Results of the central projection for the 2005
demand impact (As a per cent of GDP)
2005 demand impact
Rule-based Expert central Difference in
forecast projection percentage
points 
(=expected measures)
+1.1 –0.8 –1.9
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annual increase in employed persons in 2003 by 0.9
percentage points to 1.9%, and have raised our forecast
for the average wage increase from 17.7% to 18.3%.
In addition to the full-year effect of the increase in pub-
lic servants’ wages in the previous year, this year’s wage
growth dynamics have also been shaped by the
increase in civil servants’ wages and by the increase in
the wages of court judges and prosecutors to be imple-
mented in two stages.
The downward trend in numbers employed in general
government reversed at end-2002. The increase was
perceptible in the period from last September, and the
number of employees had risen by 4.4% by last
December relative to a year earlier, rising by 1.5% on a
yearly average. During 2003, the number of employees
has been volatile. It was 1,000 higher than the nearly
821,000 in December 2002, resulting in a yearly aver-
age increase of 2.5%. The Government has announced
staff reductions in the central government sector, which
may be implemented by the end of the 2003.17
The forecast for 2003 was based on the assumption that
total staff would be around 800,000 at year-end in the
government sector. This implies that total staff would be
2.5% less than in December 2002 (due to the layoffs
are scheduled towards the end of this year, staff level
would still be 1.9% higher on a yearly average than the
average of 2002).
Our forecast for wages in 2004 reflects the 5% increase
in public servants and other government employees’
wages in the Budget bill and the full-year effect of the
increases in judges’ and public prosecutors’ wages in
2003. Consequently, overall, average government sec-
tor wages increase by 5.7% in 2003. The forecast also
contains a 2.5% reduction in the numbers employed in
the sector, as the bill does not ensure the total cover
required to fund wage increases at the majority of the
budgetary units. The Government’s measures only affect
the local authorities indirectly, which carries a risk to the
forecast. The actual staff reduction may turn out to be
less, if local authorities ensure the cover required for
higher employment by way of using own revenues, cut-
ting investment spending or increasing indebtedness.
Transfers to households in cash will likely increase by
10.3% in nominal terms in 2003, some 0.8 percentage
points higher than the forecast in the previous Report.
In August, we used the assumption that 53rd week pen-
sions at the end of the year would only be paid out next
year. Since then this measure has been withdrawn by
the Government. Adding to transfers, the additional
increase in pensions in November turned out to be
moderately higher than our forecast. However, the cur-
rent forecast has been reduced by actual intra-year data
which have meanwhile been released. Pensions are
expected to rise by 8.3% in nominal terms in 2004. This
forecast contains, based on our own macroeconomic
projections, a higher increase in pensions, additional
one-week pensions and family allowances aimed at pre-
serving their real value.
Direct taxes and contributions affecting household
income would be increased by less, as the impact of the
1 percentage point increase in employee social security
contributions outweigh the effect of the planned reduc-
tion in PIT. The reduction in PIT was implemented
through a change to the tax schedule (rates and brack-
ets); however, the widening of the tax base, the reduc-
tion in tax credits and preferences as well as the
increase in taxes on other incomes largely offsets this
effect. In our current forecast, fiscal tightening through
this channel is lower by 0.8% of GDP relative to the
August Report.
All these translate into net wages growing some 0.5 per-
centage points lower than gross wage next year (after
this year’s 2 percentage point gap in the other direc-
tion). This –0.5 percentage point negative gap for next
year, however, implies a more relaxed fiscal stance
towards households compared to the August Report
which predicted a –3.3 percentage point gap for 2004
based on the July announcement of fiscal plans.
Changes to indirect taxes, also taking account of their
curtailing effect on consumption, are expected to result
in additional revenue equal to 0.8% of GDP. The
August Report contained a forecast for an additional
0.4% in revenue. However, the Government has since
decided that the highest VAT rate will not be reduced
to 23%. The decision to impose a 15% VAT on district
heating instead of imposing the highest rate reduces
revenue, and a couple of modifications currently under-
way, but its impact only amounts to 0.1% of GDP.
The volume of broadly defined government fixed
investment is expected to increase by up to 5% in
2003 on the basis of the CSO’s national account sta-
tistics. By contrast, in a broad definition investment
spending by general government falls, which means
that the tendency whereby the growth of spending is
different from the CSO’s statistical records continues.
The two types of accounting are different due to the
differences between the time of recording and defini-
tions; however, there was no substantial gap between
the two growth rates up to 2002 H1. The two types of
accounting are assumed to resume converging from
2004. The CSO’s investment index may be between
5%–10% in 2004, and it is expected to rise more mod-
estly in 2005.
17 The exact details of this, such as its actual impact and the size of one-off costs, etc. were unknown to us at the time of preparing this Report.
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2.1.3 HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS
AND FIXED INVESTMENT
Household consumption growth is expected to slow
down from the exceptional rates seen last year. Over
the short term, the expected slowdown is due to the
slow pace of economic growth, increasing uncertainty
as shown by some surveys, while in 2004 it is fiscal
tightening that will play a role. Later, in 2005 we expect
household consumption expenditures to pick up again
borne by stronger real wage growth and the assumed
unchanged direct tax burden.
Our forecast for household consumption expenditure
in 2003 has remained broadly unchanged relative to
the August Report. However, the forecast for 2004 has
been revised up. One reason for this increase is that
the forecasts in the August Report were based on the
fiscal adjustment programme announced by the
Government in July, while the current forecast con-
tains a more lax fiscal policy stance towards house-
holds.
The increase in household consumption expenditure
in 2003 H1 continued to be higher than at any time
between 1991–2000. Its quarterly growth rate, how-
ever, has already been slowing gradually. A number of
factors may play a role in the decline in the growth
rate. First, the pace of growth in household net income
has slackened. Second, the expectations of house-
holds have been deteriorating continuously, which
may lower consumption expenditure, due to indicat-
ing rising uncertainties. This phenomenon can be seen
in deterioration of two components of the GKI con-
sumer survey.
In forecasting 2003 consumption expenditure, Bank
staff have faced the same difficulty as discussed in the
August Report, namely, that a loose fiscal policy
changes to a restrictive fiscal policy stance resulting in a
higher uncertainty in terms of the future developments
in household income. Further deterioration in house-
holds’ perception of their future position is consistent
with our earlier assumption and we have thus broadly
maintained our forecast for 2003.
As a result of income and consumption growing nearly
identically, the gross saving rate is likely to remain basi-
cally unchanged relative to 2002.18 We expect the
dynamic growth in housing loans experienced in 2003
H1 to remain uninterrupted. Consequently, the net lend-
ing of households will fall significantly in 2003.19 Robust
18 Gross (or: total) savings rate equals the proportion of disposable income not spent on current consumption.
19 Net lending (or: net financial saving) equals gross savings net of investment spending.
Table 2-9
Household consumption, savings and fixed
investment (Annualised growth rates, per cent)
Household Real Real value of
real consumption fixed capital
net income expenditure formation
2002 Actual/ 12.3 10.2* 10.5** 20 – 30
Estimate
2003 7.9 7.8 0 –10
2004 Forecast 0.8 2.3 (–10) – 0
2005 3.1 2.6 (–5) – 5
* Original GDP data released by CSO which is the basis of our forecast.
** Revised CSO data released on 21st October 2003, see Section 5.1.
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ing rate will fall slightly relative to 2003. However, this
fall will reflect a decline in the rate of accumulation
rather than the further drop in financial savings, which
may be a source of consumption smoothing.
Gross real income and the fiscal policy stance will be
relevant factors for forecasting household behaviour in
2005. Corporate sector wages and social transfers in cash
both are expected grow more rapidly than in 2004, and
consequently gross real income will also likely increase at
a faster pace. Our assumption for the fiscal policy stance
is drawn from the deficit reduction plan outlined in the
PEP, assuming as well that taxes are not increased and the
fiscal policy stance towards households is maintained. As
an effect of these factors, net real income and the volume
of consumption expenditure rise. In contrast to 2004, con-
sumption smoothing is expected to reverse pattern in
2005, that is, income growth will likely be somewhat
stronger than the increase in consumption, with a result-
ing slight increase in the saving rate.
According to the principle followed in forecasting the
fiscal policy stance, we assume no further changes to
the housing subsidy scheme in 2005. In addition, no
pressure is expected from the income side toward high-
er dwelling investment. Consequently, in our projection
the level of dwelling expenditures remains unchanged
in 2005. As a result of unchanged capital expenditure,
the accumulation rate is expected to fall further and
households’ net lending to increase.
2.1.4 CORPORATE INVESTMENT
Manufacturing investment was level in Q2, after seeing
a strong rise in the first quarter. Whereas the actual data
for Q1 was higher than could have been inferred from
borrowing for home-building will likely give a boost to
households’ housing investment relative to 2002, with a
resulting increase in the accumulation rate.20
The expected changes in the fiscal policy stance is the
most important factor for developments in consump-
tion expenditure in 2004 relative to the August Report.
The forecast in the August Report was predicated on
the basis of the fiscal plans announced in July, which
included a restrictive policy stance towards house-
holds. The current forecast, in contrast, takes into
account the Budget Act proposal submitted to
Parliament, which contains a more lax fiscal stance
towards households relative to the assumption in the
August Report. According to the PIT Act passed in
2002, tax rates will be lowered next year, in combina-
tion with a revaluation of the income brackets; how-
ever, taking into account other burdens on incomes,
the burden on household income will change little rel-
ative to 2003. As a result, household net real income
may increase slightly, in contrast with the decline pro-
jected in August Report.
It can be assumed that households seek to smooth their
flow of spending in the face of income fluctuations, there-
fore, the volume of consumption expenditure changes
less than real income. For example, the volume of house-
hold consumption expenditure fell less than income in
1995–1996. Smoothing was even more spectacular in
2000, when a temporarily more modest income growth
was not followed by a comparable decrease in con-
sumption. In contrast to 2000, the “other” side of the
coin was seen in the period between 2002 and early
2003 when consumption grew less than income.
It is worthwhile to note, however, that consumption
smoothing expected in 2004 would not necessarily lead
to an increase in the financial saving rate, as financial
savings are only one of the components of the gross
saving rate (derived as the difference between income
and consumption). Households finance their capital
expenditure from gross savings, the overwhelming part
of which is accounted for by amounts spent on dwelling
investment. In the period 2002–2003, dwelling invest-
ment and hence also the rate of accumulation
increased, thus ‘crowding out’ financial savings.
Based on the aforementioned, in determining the scale
of smoothing we have taken account of the fact that
households’ financial savings have fallen significantly in
recent years, and so households will likely spend less on
consumption to the detriment of their wealth than they
did earlier. Accordingly, we assume that households will
adjust more rapidly to fluctuations in their incomes.
Even so, consumption growth is expected to be higher
than real income growth in 2004. That is, the gross sav-
2 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
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20 Accumulation rate equals the proportion of disposable income spent on accumulation of real assets (usually residential property investment).
Chart 2-5
Household real disposable income and
consumption expenditure 1994–2005 
(On a year earlier, per cent)
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Fixed investment is expected to grow more modestly in
2004 than forecast in the August Report, as a result of
the lower level of external demand and a stronger
exchange rate, affecting primarily manufacturing. The
higher exchange rate of the forint vis-à-vis the euro,
along with basically static unit labour costs, means that
we have not incorporated in the current forecast the
projection for a more modest improvement in compet-
itiveness which was postulated in the August Report.
Based on these assumptions, our forecast calls for manu-
facturing investment to grow by 5.3% in 2004.
We expect corporate sector fixed investment in 2004
to slow by slightly less, as the rate of growth of invest-
ment in market services is unlikely to change much rel-
ative to the previous data. Moreover, the forecast for
consumption demand has been revised upward,
although its impact on investment by market service
other indicators of economic activity, the exact oppo-
site was true in respect of the actual data for Q2. This
reversal was not characteristic of the entire corporate
sector—growth in the second quarter was largely in line
with the forecast in the August Report. Over the short
term, therefore, we have lowered our forecast for man-
ufacturing investment and expect greater uncertainty.
However, the forecast for the entire corporate sector
has been broadly maintained.
Over the medium term, weaker external demand and a
stronger real exchange rate relative to the August
assumption are expected to hamper growth in business
sector investment. Nevertheless, the clearer outlook for
external demand which has emerged recently reduces
the medium-term risks to the forecast for fixed invest-
ment activity.
In the August Report, economic conditions were
assessed against the background of a strong increase in
manufacturing investment in Q1, noting that its scale
may have been excessive and might be corrected later.
Based on data for Q2, this predicted correction took
place. Nonetheless, this does not mean that economic
prospects have worsened. On the contrary, according
to the Kopint-Datorg corporate survey conducted in
Q3, capacity utilisation grew in the period, with an
increase in the proportion of firms that judged their
capacities to be low in relation to their expected orders
as well. Although the low outturn for the second quar-
ter has reduced the 2003 estimate of 3.4% in the
August Report to 2.0%, we continue to expect invest-
ment activity to gain upward momentum. The risks too
are now somewhat lower than earlier. This view is also
supported by the improvement in expectations
attached to domestic economic activity relative to the
previous quarter.
However, the short-term outlook for the corporate sec-
tor has barely changed: second-quarter actual data con-
formed with our forecast. Hence, growth in corporate
sector investment in 2003 has remained broadly
unchanged at 3.4%.
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Chart 2-6
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Table 2-10
Annual average growth of business fixed
investment, per cent
Actual Forecast
2002* 2002** 2003 2004 2005
Manufacturing investment –10.4 –9.0 2.0 5.3 5.6
Corporate investment –4.6 –2.1 3.4 5.2 6.2
* The original data of the CSO for 2002 GDP data. Our forecast is
based on these figures.
** The revised 2002 GDP data published by the CSO on 21st
October 2003. See Section 5.1.
Chart 2-7
Fixed investment volume in manufacturing and
the corporate sector
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providers is only indirect and is difficult to capture.
Overall, we expect corporate sector investment to
expand by 5.2%, just marginally less than the forecast
5.3% growth provided in August.
Investment in manufacturing and the entire corporate
sector in 2005 is expected to grow at a similar rate as
2004. This reflects the assumption that a more modest
slowdown in output of market services will be accom-
panied by an improvement in quarterly growth rates
(see Section 2.2), so the sector’s investment activity will
remain higher than in manufacturing. Fixed investment
in the corporate sector and in manufacturing is forecast
to grow by 6.2% and 5.6% respectively in 2005.
2.1.5 INVENTORY INVESTMENT
Whether it is the cyclical upturn or other processes that
are reflected in the figures remains an issue even after
the release of actual inventory data for Q2. The picture
of economic activity painted by output data and pro-
jections (see Section 2.2) would be consistent with the
increase in purchased inventories, while the level of fin-
ished stocks would rather be declining.
Manufacturing inventories have been increasing rela-
tively strongly for nearly a year now. At least half of this,
however, has been accounted for by a build-up in fin-
ished goods inventories. While the rise in the stocks of
purchased inventories may point to more favourable
expectations attached to the business cycle, it is possi-
ble that this relates mainly to activities in the external
markets, which may also be inferred from the relatively
robust pick-up in manufacturing exports. Consequently,
inventory changes have not yet provided solid evidence
in respect of the domestic business cycle.
However, retail sector inventory stocks (nearly all of
which are composed of purchased stocks) fell drastical-
ly in 2003 H1. That may be attributable to our increas-
ingly strong view outlined in Section 2.1.5 of the August
Report that this may be linked to reduction of invento-
ries by the firms involved, in anticipation of a slowdown
in consumption in 2004.
As a result of the different developments in the two
types of inventories, whole-economy inventories stag-
nated in 2003 Q2, after rising in previous quarters. This
stands in contrast to the massive rise in stocks in the
GDP statistics released for Q2; but it should be noted
that discrepancies between the two types of whole-
economy inventory data21 have occurred in the past.
This in turn appears to reinforce the view that develop-
ments in inventories continue to be too uncertain for
conclusions to be drawn in respect of the domestic
business cycle.
2.1.6 EXTERNAL TRADE
This year can characterised by sluggish exports and
buoyant import growth, with net exports restraining the
rate of economic growth. This situation can be explained
by weak external demand and strong domestic demand.
In 2004 and 2005 we expect the picture to change due
to the pick up in external demand already visible this
year and the slowdown in domestic demand, and thus
net exports will again contribute to GDP growth.
In our August forecast we expected that external trade
would hamper economic growth in 2003. In 2003 H1,
developments in external trade proved to be even more
negative than anticipated. Explanation for this was the
decline in external demand and the increasing appetite
of robust domestic demand for imports. The rate of
export growth was weaker than forecast, whereas
imports grew more rapidly than thought. The size of
Hungary’s export markets expanded only marginally in
H1, due to the revision of data for the country’s trading
partners, which was also consistent with the slow
increase in Hungarian exports.22
We anticipate stronger growth in exports in H2, as is
underlined by recent trade data. Import growth contin-
ues to be robust, but the slowdown in domestic
demand has reduced import demand.
Chart 2-8
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21 It should be noted, that the so called statistical discrepancy is also accounted for in the change-in-inventories item.
22 In analysing this year’s export data, the ‘X-box’ effect significantly increasing foreign trade turnover in 2002 H1 should not be neglected, which added
some 2 percentage points to the annual rate of trade flows last year. The appearance of the X-box in foreign trade is the result of a one-off relocation
decision, and is not informative in respect of long-term developments. Based on data calculated after eliminating this effect, the quarter-on-quarter
indices signal a pick-up in exports from 2003 Q2.
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Growth in whole-economy exports will be slower than
growth in goods exports in 2003, due in part to the decline
in travel revenue. Travel revenue has continued to fall this
year, similar to 2002. The slowdown in global economic
activity has been the principal cause of this weak perform-
ance of travel, although the effect of the earlier real appre-
ciation of the forint exchange rate also played a role.
We expect exports to grow slightly more strongly than
Hungary’s external markets in 2004 relative to 2003. This
trend is forecast to continue in 2005. However, the
delayed effect of the real appreciation of the exchange
rate in the previous two years will likely undermine
export growth in 2004. A stronger real exchange rate
than assumed in the previous Report represents a down-
side risk to next year’s export growth, but we assume this
effect to be offset by the greater-than-previously expect-
ed responsiveness of Hungarian exports to develop-
ments in external business conditions. Exports are expect-
ed to increase more rapidly than imports in 2004; and the
need for imports borne by domestic demand declines
considerably. In our forecast, whole-economy exports
and imports rise by 7.5% and 6.0%, respectively, in 2004.
In 2005, exports are expected to continue growing and
imports to pick up slightly as an effect of a tentative upturn
in domestic demand. In the current forecast, whole-
economy exports rise by 8.1% and imports by 7.0%.
One way of measuring international competitiveness is to
examine market shares.23 For the acceding countries, com-
paring their shares of the EU’s import market is a natural
choice. As discussed in our earlier analyses, the three
largest acceding countries (the Czech Republic, Poland
and Hungary) all increased their share of EU imports up to
2002. This process even gained pace, after stalling in 2000.
Using the forecasts for the three countries under exami-
nation and for the growth of EU imports, we have esti-
mated the developments in the three countries’ market
shares for the period up to 2005. According to the results,
only Poland is likely to continue increasing its market
share dynamically. Despite its relatively weak export per-
formance in 2003 H1, Hungary will likely be able to add
to its market share, although the extent of this gain will be
much more modest than in earlier years. Surprisingly, the
Czech Republic may even lose some of its market share
from 2004, based on the current projections.
2.1.7 EXTERNAL BALANCE
For the first time, our forecast contains an analysis of
Hungary’s current account according using a methodolo-
gy which includes non-residents’ reinvested earnings in
Hungary as well. The reason for the shift to this
approach is that the MNB will begin releasing data on
non-residents’ reinvested earnings in its official balance
of payments releases starting from 2004.
The financial accounts data published by the MNB make
it possible to analyse Hungary’s external equilibrium posi-
tion in accordance with standard international methodol-
ogy from 1998. Data for earlier years have been pro-
duced using estimates. The MNB will publish the official
data series on 31 March 2004, going back to 1995.24
It should be noted that recording reinvested earnings
does not entail an extra financing requirement, as non-
Chart 2-9
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residents’ reinvested earnings are recorded as direct for-
eign investment with an offsetting amount in the finan-
cial account. However, taking account of reinvested
earnings allows to make comparisons with international
balance of payments data, and the adjusted balance of
payments tend to behave differently along the eco-
nomic cycle. Dependence on foreign owners has
become more emphatic as a result of direct investment,
as their decisions to reinvest their profits do have a con-
siderable influence on external balance. 
The balance of payments, calculated according to this
method (to be applied from 2004), shows a 2–2.5 per-
centage point higher deficit as a proportion of GDP.
This new external equilibrium indicator paints a consid-
erably different picture for earlier years as well.25 Taking
account of reinvested earnings, the 1995 adjustment is
seen in a different light. The influence of the adjustment
on external balance was significant, though smaller and
shorter than one was led to believe based on earlier
data. The results of our examination have shown that
developments in corporate investment has the
strongest impact on the external balance, in addition to
the changes in the position of general government.
In 2001–2002, the large-scale deterioration in the posi-
tion of general government was not accompanied by a
considerable shift in the external balance because firms
reduced their investment activities significantly.
In 2003, the position of general government has
improved slightly, but partly as a result of fiscal policy
there has been a large fall in household sector net sav-
ings. The corporate sector financing requirement has
increased in line with the development of the external
economic cycle, and thus it has been the change in the
private sector’s position that has caused the deteriora-
tion in external balance.
We expect the general government borrowing require-
ment to decline in 2004–2005. The private sector’s
financing capacity will likely be lower as corporate
investment picks up. However, its extent will be smaller
than the contractionary impact of general government
on demand. Consequently, the external financing
requirement will fall slightly.
Developments in reinvested earnings raise the issue of
how investors’ willingness to reinvest earnings evolved
in the period and what assumptions can be employed
in respect of the future. The ratio of non-residents’ rein-
vested earnings to their total income has been stable in
Hungary in recent years, fluctuating at around 50%.
With the decline in corporate investment, willingness to
reinvest earnings fell in both 2001 and 2002. According
to our forecast, reinvested earnings as a proportion of
non-residents’ total earnings rises in Hungary from
2003, in tandem with the upturn in the corporate invest-
ment cycle.
Compared to the projections in the August Report, based
on the methodology currently in effect, the current
account deficit is expected to be 6.4% of GDP in 2003,
higher than projected earlier, as a result of the increase in
the general government borrowing requirement. We fore-
25 Our analysis of the external equilibrium indicator which includes reinvested earnings was published in the June 2003 Report on Financial Stability.
(http://english.mnb.hu/dokumentumok/stabil_0306_en.pdf). For a detailed analysis, see Zsuzsa Fekete and Gábor Vadas: A new approach to external
equilibrium, MNB Background Studies (currently in publication).
Chart 2-11
Current account deficit according to the current
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cast the external financing requirement to fall by about
1% as a proportion of GDP in 2004. However, due to the
methodology of recording EU-related transfers, the cur-
rent account deficit is expected to be 6.0% of GDP, near-
ly the same as this year. The current account deficit is
expected to fall modestly in 2005, to 5.3% of GDP, as an
effect of the fiscal adjustment programme.
The increase in the external financing requirement in
2003 is expected to be stronger than assumed in the
August Report due to the higher general government
borrowing requirement. At the same time, the private
sector’s financing capacity will likely fall, in line with our
previous forecast. This is due to the fact that, based on
data currently available, outstanding housing loans will
rise robustly, accompanied by a high level of household
consumption. Household consumption and demand for
housing loans are not expected to increase further in
Q4, so the sector’s net saving position will remain posi-
tive, though much lower than in 2002. Corporate sector
financing capacity will also fall this year, as firms’ capital
expenditure has resumed rising after declining in 2002.
In our forecast for 2004, the external financing require-
ment is lower as a proportion of GDP. The general gov-
ernment borrowing requirement also falls as a result of
the fiscal contraction of demand, though it remains at a
very high level. Household disposable income rises at a
much slower pace than in 2003, so households’ net sav-
ings are forecast to increase slightly. Corporate sector
investment grows in line with development of the exter-
nal business cycle.
If the deficit reduction plan set forth in the PEP is imple-
mented, the fiscal contraction of demand will continue
in 2005 and, as a result, the external financing require-
ment will fall moderately. In our forecast, household net
savings continue to be stable rather than to rise. Firms’
capital expenditure grow only slightly, with a resulting
increase in their financing requirement.
The effect of EU accession is assumed to be neutral for the
external financing requirement. According to our calcula-
tions, the effects of EU transfers, the different recording of
customs duties and contributions by Hungary will be off-
setting overall. In our assumption, EU-related settlements
will add some 0.4% of GDP to the current account deficit,
as Hungary’s contributions will be recorded as transfers
among current items, while a part of transfers from the EU
will be recorded in the capital account.
Table 2-11
Current account deficit and financing capacity of sectors according to the current 
and new methodology in effect from 2004 (As a per cent of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estimate Forecast
I.  General government* (–5.0) (–9.3) (–8.2) (–7.4) (–6.4)
II. Private sector (1+2) 2.2 5.6 1.9 2.0 1.9
1. Households 5.1 2.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
2. Corporate sector** (–2.9) 3.0 1.7 1.6 1.3
Financing requirement (I.+II.)*** (–2.8) (–3.7) (–6.4) (–5.3) (–4.5)
Current account balance (–3.4) (–4.0) (–6.4) (–6.0) (–5.3)
–in EUR billions (–2.0) (–2.8) (–4.7) (–4.7) (–4.5)
Reinvested earnings (–2.3) (–2.0) (–2.2) (–2.1) (–2.0)
Corporate sector including reinvested earnings (–5.2) 0.9 (–0.5) (–0.6) (–0.7)
Financing capacity including reinvested earnings**** (–5.1) (–5.8) (–8.5) (–7.5) (–6.5)
Current account balance including reinvested (–5.8) (–6.1) (–8.6) (–8.1) (–7.3)
earnings
–in EUR billions (–3.3) (–4.2) (–6.3) (–6.4) (–6.2)
* Specially constructed cash flow indicator to analyse net saving positions. It includes not only the general government's balance, but also the
financing requirement of some publicly owned corporations.
** Financial and non-financial corporations combined. Government spending on motorway construction is included in general government sec-
tor data.
*** The external financing requirement includes the current and capital account balances.
**** Reinvested earnings have been derived from the MNB's financial accounts data. See Section 5.2.
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External demand turned out to be lower than previous-
ly thought, and the real exchange rate stronger.
Consequently, a moderate deterioration in competitive-
ness has narrowed the room for domestic output to
grow. Nevertheless, by 2005, manufacturing output and
value added should both rise at a robust pace.
Over the medium term, market services value added
reflects the slowdown in consumption expenditure and
a lower external demand path relative to the previous
assumption. As a result, market services value added is
expected to grow below its rate seen in previous years.
Growth in construction is also anticipated to continue
slowing, although some recovery may start in 2005.
As mentioned in the August Report, domestic manufac-
turing began to pick up from early 2002. In the given
phase of the business cycle, this could only be
explained by the simultaneous robust expansion of
German imports. This explanation was underscored by
the fact that whereas sales in domestic manufacturing
were flat, exports were clearly experiencing a dynamic
upturn. Hungarian subsidiaries of large German firms
which exported primarily investment goods must have
played a dominant role in this process. This early recov-
ery was accompanied by value added growing with a
significant lag behind gross output. This difference has
been reduced in the revised GDP data published by the
CSO (see Section 5.1).
Growth in domestic manufacturing output stalled in
2003 Q1, possibly in relation to the particularly strong
increase in uncertainties surrounding the prospects for
external demand. However, expectations regarding
external economic conditions saw significant improve-
ment from the second quarter, giving new impetus to
gross manufacturing output, albeit the increase in value
added continued to be weak in the second quarter.
Based on data for Q3, domestic business sentiment
seems to have recovered. Consequently, we expect
manufacturing output growth to gather momentum in
the second half. All this may allow gross manufacturing
output to grow by 3.4% and value added by 1.6%.
Two factors limiting the extent of growth over the medi-
um term are that the level of external demand has been
lower and the unit labour cost-based real exchange rate
has been stronger than we expected. Consequently,
although manufacturing output will likely grow evenly
in 2004, its rate will be lower than forecast in the
August Report. On a yearly average, gross output may
rise by 6.0% and value added by 5.2% relative to 2003.
2.2 OUTPUT
Chart 2-13
Domestic business confidence index from
KOPINT survey (Data weighted by the MNB*)
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Table 2-12
Output
(Average annual growth rates, per cent)
Actual Forecast
2002** 2002*** 2003 2004 2005
Gross output of
manufacturing 3.9 3.9 3.4 6.0 7.9
Value added in 
manufacturing* 0.8 2.8 1.6 5.2 6.4
Value added
in market services 4.1 5.1 3.9 3.5 3.0
Value added
in construction 10.0 16.7 5.7 3.8 4.5
* Adjusted series.
** The original data of the CSO for 2002 GDP data. Our forecast is
based on these figures.
*** The revised 2002 GDP data published by the CSO on October,
21. See Section 5.1.
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In 2005, annual growth rates will likely reflect the vig-
orous development of external demand, and hence
manufacturing is expected to grow relatively strongly,
equivalent to a 6% expansion of the size of Hungary’s
export market—gross output and value added may grow
by 7.9% and 6.4%, respectively. There remain substan-
tial upside risks to this growth path, as export sales may
potentially be considerably higher relative to the central
projection.
Growth in market services has been declining recently.
Transport services, linked more to the evolution of
external economic activity, and financial services have
been the major causes of this development. In 2002
and the first half of 2003, the strong increase in house-
hold consumption kept the growth rate of value added
in commercial services at high levels, which had a
counter effect. However, in 2004 the growth of house-
hold consumption is expected to slow considerably, in
addition to an increase in taxes affecting consumption.
Accordingly, the rate of growth is likely to moderate
further in market services, despite the rebound in exter-
nal demand. We expect growth to be 3.9% in 2003
and 3.5% in 2004. Value added in market services will
likely continue to grow along this lower quarterly
growth path in 2005. We do not expect growth to
decelerate further; indeed, growth will likely pick up
towards year-end as an effect of the recovery of exter-
nal demand. However, all this implies some 3% growth
for the year as a whole, lagging behind the outturns for
earlier years.
The performance of construction was weak in 2003 Q1
(probably the result of the unusually bitter winter), fol-
lowed by a correction in Q2 towards the path forecast
in the August Report. Nevertheless, the data which have
become available (most notably the stock of construc-
tion firms’ existing orders and the size of new orders)
suggest a further slump in growth. The fall in the stock
of existing orders for construction firms’ output mainly
affected the category ‘other structures’. In addition,
building construction is expected to grow at a slower
pace. The sector’s value added is thus expected to be
only 3.8% in 2004, after rising by 5.7% in 2003. We
expect output of ‘other structures’ (which include the
most important central government orders as well) to
increase mildly in 2005. Consequently, the sector’s total
output may reach 4.5%.
Chart 2-14
Manufacturing output and value added*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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In the preceding quarter there were further signs of
slower corporate nominal wage adjustment to disinfla-
tion: wage inflation has stopped declining in manufac-
turing and has edged up slightly in market services. In
our assessment deceleration in wage adjustment is tran-
sient in both manufacturing and market services. Wage
inflation is expected to fall in both sectors from 2004,
although for different reasons and to varying degrees.
Similarly to the previous Report, in formulating the wage
projection, we attached great importance to both short
and long-term inflation expectations. Accordingly, our
key assumption is that companies come to realise that
the increase in consumer prices generated by indirect
taxes will not produce extra sales revenues in 2004. As
companies do not interpret rising prices as a general infla-
tion shock, they are unlikely to adopt a softer wage poli-
cy. It is also assumed that corporate bargaining power is
strong in wage negotiations, so companies will be able to
defy all potential, higher inflation-induced demands for
higher wages. Should the above assumptions fail to mate-
rialise, inflationary pressure in the private sector may well
be higher than previously projected.
Relative to our last forecast, cost-push inflation (quanti-
fied on the basis of ULC) is unlikely to increase sub-
stantially in the private sector in both 2003 and 2004. A
stronger exchange rate is expected to trigger more
forceful adjustment in manufacturing. As a result, nomi-
nal wage inflation will decrease more considerably,
whereas productivity will grow more dynamically there
than in market services. Consequently, unit labour costs
are expected to remain broadly the same in manufac-
turing in both 2004 and 2005, and increase by 7.5%
and 5.5%, respectively, in market services.
Table 3-1
Summary table of labour market indicators
(Percentage changes on a year earlier)
MNB Projection
esti-
mate*
August Report Current Report
2002 2003 2004 2003 2004 2005
Manufacturing
Employment (–1.9) (–1.9) (–0.1) (–2.0) (–1.0) 0.4
Wage inflation* 11.6 8.2 7.3 8.0 7.0 5.9
Productivity** 2.7 4.3 5.4 3.8 6.1 5.7
ULC**** 7.2 2.9 1.7 3.1 0.3 0.1
Market services
Employment 1.5 1.8 0.9 2.0 2.3 1.6
Wage inflation* 13.5 10.3 8.8 10.2 9.4 7.1
Productivity** 2.6 2.1 2.6 1.9 1.0 1.4
ULC**** 9.1 7.3 5.8 7.4 7.5 5.5
Private sector**
Employment (–0.2) 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.7 1.1
Wage inflation* 12.6 9.3 8.1 9.2 8.3 6.5
Productivity** 2.8 3.2 3.8 2.9 3.4 3.3
ULC**** 8.0 5.1 3.9 5.2 4.1 3.0
* MNB estimates based on data reported by the Central Statistical
Office (see Manual to Hungarian economic statistics).
** Average of manufacturing and market services. 
*** Productivity: volume of value added per employee. The recent revi-
sion of 2002 manufacturing value added data is not considered.
**** ULC denotes nominal increases in labour costs per unit of value
added. The recent revision of 2002 manufacturing value added
data is not considered.
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Total number of hours worked is considered a good indi-
cator of labour usage as a factor of production. Total
hours worked provides a combined appraisal of the
effect of changes in staff and the hours worked per per-
son (a type of labour intensity). The 2003 Q2 data show
that total hours worked in the private sector continued
to decline slowly. As a result, labour usage in the private
sector has been moderate since early 2001. The under-
lying reason for this is conflicting developments in the
labour market in manufacturing and market services.
Total hours worked in manufacturing has plunged since
end-2000, the underlying reasons for which are lower
employment and a drop in the number of the average
hours worked. Though the August Report stated that
average hours worked by manual workers in manufac-
turing had started to increase at the start of 2003, based
on recently revised CSO data, the turning point now
seems to be in the last quarter. This continues to repre-
sent a large degree of uncertainty surrounding the per-
ception of the relevant developments. Moreover, the
increase in the total hours worked in the past quarter
has not affected all the sectors identically: it was most
pronounced in the chemical, timber and textiles indus-
tries. It has, however, left machinery (representing the
largest weight and the strongest expansion in produc-
tion) unaffected.
The business cycle and average manual hours in manu-
facturing moved in close conjunction between 1995
and 2001. That is, labour usage was on the increase in
the upward phase of the cycle while in the downward
phase companies chose to decrease working hours
rather than resort to costly layoffs. Since 2002, howev-
er, there have been signs of incongruity in this co-move-
ment. Despite a pick-up in the business cycle, the num-
ber of hours worked declined steadily until early 2003.
Due to the fact that data series on working hours are
often revised, this is likely to be a transitory phenome-
non. At the same time, however, permanent changes in
earlier trends may suggest that, in addition to the busi-
ness cycle, other factors also affect labour usage in man-
ufacturing. Such factors include changes in the structure
of production, i.e. in the ratio of input factors of pro-
duction.
Reduced labour usage and slowly but steadily expand-
ing production combined to generate robust growth in
productivity in manufacturing from year-end 2002.
3.1 LABOUR USAGE
Chart 3-1
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Either innovative production technologies (technologi-
cal shocks) or substituting capital for labour to a grow-
ing extent may account for the increased productivity.
We assume that the phenomenon of substituting capi-
tal for labour may be ascribed to the fact that labour
costs have risen dramatically over the past two years. At
the same time, subdued manufacturing investment and
highly volatile data in the past quarters significantly add
to the uncertainties surrounding this assumption.26
As any potential change in the structure of production
is part of long-term corporate strategies, we assume
that, despite further recovery in the business cycle,
employment in manufacturing is unlikely to rebound to
its 2000 level. Accordingly, we project changes in the
sectoral distribution of employment. That is, in our
assessment, a certain number of employees laid off in
manufacturing will be absorbed by the market services
sector.27
Labour usage in market services has been improving
since 2000, which primarily means dynamic increase in
employment with broadly flat average hours worked.
The recent increase in employment in the market services
sector can be attributed to consistently strong domestic
demand. We assume that external demand will take
over the role of weaker domestic demand in 2005. As
a result, a stable recovery is expected in the market
services sector in the future.
Our projection for employment is in keeping with the
foregoing. The recovery in the global business cycle,
deteriorating competitiveness due to a stronger real
exchange rate and corporate decisions on production
input ratios all combine to influence employment in
manufacturing. Such factors are expected to reduce
employment in manufacturing until the year-end 2004,
and then boost it slightly in 2005.
In the market services sector the business cycle allows
employment to rise steadily, with labour becoming avail-
able owing to redundancies in manufacturing. We proj-
ect an annual average increase of 2% in employment in
the market services sector between 2003 and 2005.
In all, this year we expect a stagnating level of employ-
ment in the private sector as a whole. In 2004–2005 we
project labour demand to revive somewhat, with a con-
comitant modest increase in private sector employment.
Chart 3-3
Number of full-time employees
800
780
760
740
720
700
680
660
640
620
800
780
760
740
720
700
680
660
640
620
Thousands of people Thousands of people
19
97
 Q
1
19
97
 Q
3
19
98
 Q
1
19
98
 Q
3
19
99
 Q
1
19
99
 Q
3
20
00
 Q
1
20
00
 Q
3
20
01
 Q
1
20
01
 Q
3
20
02
 Q
1
20
02
 Q
3
20
03
 Q
1
20
03
 Q
3
20
04
 Q
1
20
04
 Q
3
20
05
 Q
1
20
05
 Q
3
Private services Manufacturing
26 Note however, that part of the decline in manufacturing employment is linked to a rather permanent fall in textiles industry. This is not likely to be part
of a capital/labour substitution.
27 Sectoral shifts are also expected to affect the government sector. Employment there is expected to fall by over 4% (equivalent to 30,000 persons) by
the year-end 2005 (see Section 2. 1. 2). We project that a certain number of the employees to be laid off in the government sector will find employ-
ment in the market services sector.
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Over the past one and a half years, the rate of unem-
ployment, which is arguably a reliable near-term indica-
tor of market reserves in economy, has only increased
by 0.5 percentage point, despite downturns in the glob-
al economy and the real appreciation of the forint. This
trend has been corroborated by data on registered
unemployment. The reason for the moderate increase
in unemployment is that although the participation rate
has been rising steadily since early 2002, and no sub-
stantial labour demand has arisen in the private sector,
dynamic growth in public sector employment has pre-
vented the accumulation of significant labour reserves.
Most recent data reveal that the upward trend in unem-
ployment came to a halt in early 2003, with the rate
already starting to fall slightly in Q2. The underlying expla-
nation for this trend reversal is rising employment in the
whole economy. Whether or not this trend will be perma-
nent and, in turn, result in steadily falling unemployment in
the coming quarters remains uncertain for several reasons.
One source of uncertainty is that in the private sector other
information on labour demand fails to indicate a quick
recovery in employment. Instances of announced mass
redundancies have been on the increase since the start of
2002. Recent data, too, fail give any indication of changes
in earlier trends in Q2. At the same time, following a short
period of increase, the number of reported vacancies has
fallen. According to the data excess capacities seem to be
present in the private sector, and we expect labour
demand to strengthen over the longer term only.
3.2 LABOUR MARKET RESERVES AND TIGHTNESS
Chart 3-4
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Chart 3-7
Projection for activity and unemployment
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The other source of uncertainty that adversely affects
future whole-economy employment is the development of
labour demand in the public sector. We anticipate that
planned layoffs in the government sector will reduce
labour demand in the public sector more markedly in 2004
and to a lesser degree in 2005. Taking into account slowly
recovering labour usage in the private sector, this will result
in rising unemployment. For lack of relevant information, at
present no projection can be made as to how many of
those to be laid off in the public sector will become inac-
tive or how many will remain in the labour market and
become unemployed. As there is no further relevant infor-
mation, in preparing our forecast, we relied on the assump-
tion that those to be laid off in the public sector would
become either inactive or active in the labour market in
equal numbers. So our projection is for a halt in the previ-
ous rise in the activity rate, with a renewed increase in the
rate expected to begin in 2005. Unemployment rises
slightly and remains around 6% over the forecast period.
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Corporate nominal wage adjustment to disinflation has
slowed further since the August Report. Monthly data
show that wage inflation in manufacturing has been flat
since early 2003, and that nominal wage growth in the
market services sector has yet again started to rise. As
postulated in the August Report, the interruption in
nominal wage adjustment can be attributed to buoyant
demand and rising inflation expectations.
The most recent TÁRKI business survey reveals that firms’
wage growth expectations have got stuck at the level
recorded in July, indicating that the continuous decrease
in wage expectations have come to an end. With wage
growth expectations stuck, firms’ inflation expectations
have increased considerably (see Section 1.3).
In addition to inflation expectations, the effects of
strong demand may be contributing to this interruption
in nominal wage adjustment. This particularly holds true
for market services, while contrary to our previous
assumption, no current signs of an upswing in labour
demand are discernible.
In the market services sector wage inflation has been
increasing for the past few months. However, due to
the noisiness of monthly data, acceleration in wage
growth cannot be interpreted as a long-term trend. In
our opinion, the rather moderate growth that business-
es in the market services sector has experienced in their
labour-side profitability28 over the past period does not
allow for the possibility of the adoption of a more lax
wage policy over the short term despite current strong
demand. Accordingly, we assume that the recent data
of an accelerating wage inflation in this sector show
momentary effects. 
Overall, wage inflation is expected to remain broadly
flat in both manufacturing and market services during
the rest of the year, which is corroborated by informa-
tion on rising inflation expectations and a buoyant
domestic demand. However, steady growth in the mar-
ket services sector, wage inflation may pose upward
risks to our near-term projection.
Relative to the August Report, our current long-term
projection for developments in private sector wages
remains basically the same. The reason for this is that in
preparing our projection, we maintained two assump-
tions for firms’ wage setting policy. One is that firms
come to realise that increase in consumer prices gener-
ated by indirect taxes will not produce extra sales rev-
enues in 2004. As producers do not interpret rising
prices as a general inflation shock, they will not adopt a
softer wage policy. The other is that firms’ bargaining
power is strong in wage negotiations, so they can defy
all potential, higher inflation-induced demand for wage
increase. In so doing, they will be able to practically
pass increased tax burden on to consumers.
Changes over the past quarter in other exogenous
factors embodied in the projection have modified our
expectations of wage dynamics in the individual sec-
tors. A stronger exchange rate, slightly subdued exter-
nal and vigorous domestic demand and anticipated
moderate labour demand in manufacturing all point
to faster nominal wage adjustment in manufacturing
and slower nominal wage adjustment in the market
services sector. Sales prices of tradables kept low by
the stronger exchange rate and lengthy sluggishness
in productivity owing to subdued external demand
3.3 WAGE INFLATION
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28 Firms’ labour-side profitability is approximated using the inverse of real ULCs.
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provide little room for nominal wage increase in manu-
facturing. Substantial labour reserves in this sector may
also result in lower wages.
By contrast, higher sales prices in market services and
productivity growth induced by vigorous demand may
well lead to more vigorous growth in nominal wages.
Labour reserves are tighter in this sector, which may
give employees an edge in wage negotiations. 
Given these factors, we project nominal wage growth
of 7% and 9.4% in manufacturing and market services,
respectively, in 2004. Wage inflation is expected to be
5.9% in manufacturing and 7.1% in market services in
2005.
Our projection includes strong upside risks to wage
inflation. Continuation of the upward trend in wages in
the market services sector experienced in Q3 over the
short term may result in a higher inflation, and also the
assumption on firms’ inflation expectations leads to
upside risks. Past experience has shown that wage infla-
tion in the private sector usually exceeds the upper lim-
its approved by the National Interest Reconciliation
Council (NIRC) by 1-2 percentage points. If this pattern
reoccurs next year, then the risks carried by wage
increases in excess of our 8.3% baseline forecast for
next year would be high despite the 7-8% target
approved by NIRC. On the other hand, higher unem-
ployment may lead to lower wage inflation.
Chart 3-9
Wage inflation projection*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter indices)
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In 2003 Q2, unit labour cost growth in the private sec-
tor was somewhat stronger than in the previous quarter,
with an annual rate of approximately 5%. Positive
dynamics means that the growth rate of wage costs is
still well in excess of expansion in productivity.
Furthermore, continuous slowdown in the dynamics of
unit labour costs that started in late 2000 seems to have
faltered in the past quarter. This can be attributed to
slower nominal wage adjustment.
As described in detail in our earlier reports, domestic
companies had to adjust to both external and domestic
shocks in 2001 and 2002. Slack external demand led to
flat productivity in manufacturing. Falling prices of trad-
able goods as well as wage inflation that—even with a
stronger nominal exchange rate—was stuck at an earlier
level of dynamics in productivity reduced firms’ labour-
side profitability significantly.
The fact that nominal wage adjustment failed to materi-
alise in 2001 did not mean a complete lack of corporate
adjustment. Corporate adjustment took place through
curbing labour usage: first through the reduction of the
hours worked, and then through layoffs. As a result, manu-
facturing productivity did not decrease. It remained flat in
2001, and then started to increase.
In 2002, nominal wage growth, too, started to adjust.
This and improving productivity managed to prevent
further substantial deterioration in firms’ labour-side
profitability that year. Nominal wage adjustment came
to a halt again in early 2003. Yet, this failed to lead to
further improvement in profitability, despite accelerat-
ing productivity.
The minimum wage hikes have amounted to cost shocks
in market services in the past two years.29 Though this
sector has experienced a permanently buoyant business
activity over the past quarter, increasing employment
3.4 UNIT LABOUR COSTS AND COMPETITIVENESS
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Chart 3-11
Productivity, wages and profits in manufacturing*
(Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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29 Only part of the raises in the minimum wage actually adds to increase in wages because of the wages paid in the informal economy. (For details, see
Manual on Hungarian Economic Statistics of the MNB.) The corrected time series that we have adopted allows for this actual effect.
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has only allowed for the possibility of moderate growth
in productivity. Firms’ labour-side profitability in market
services deteriorated in 2001 and 2002, owing to
increases in the minimum wage. We believe that the
increases in the minimum wage affect wage inflation
only slightly in 2003. Nevertheless, wage adjustment,
which is slower in this sector than in manufacturing,
came to a halt in 2003 H1, with nominal wages starting
to take off at an increasing pace. We assume that mod-
erate expansion in productivity will prevent companies
from adopting looser wage policies. Consequently, our
projection is for flat wage inflation in 2003 and for a
slow decrease from 2004.
n keeping with its projections for wages, employment
and output, we forecast different developments in the
two sectors. The forint exchange rate, stronger than pre-
viously assumed, as well as a slow pick-up in external
demand requires more significant adjustment. Accordingly,
both employment adjustment and nominal wage adjust-
ment are expected to take off from 2004. Vigorous
expansion in productivity (6.1% and 5.7% in 2004 and
2005, respectively) may lead to a near-flat evolution of
ULC (0.3% and 0.1%, respectively). As a result, corpo-
rate profitability may improve despite the stable prices
for tradable goods.
Weaker domestic activity and recovery in the global
business cycle in the market services sector are likely to
generate steady demand. In addition, we forecast high
market services inflation (see Section 1.2) which eases
pressure for firms’ adjustment in market services.
Hence, in this sector wage adjustment is expected to be
slower than in manufacturing, and lower productivity
(1.0% and 1.4%, respectively) is likely to result in high-
er ULC dynamics (7.5% and 5.5%, respectively). We
anticipate only slow improvement in profitability.
Overall, relative to the August Report, cost-push infla-
tion in the private sector rises only slightly, with the indi-
vidual sectors adding to inflationary pressure to varying
degrees. Inflationary pressure will be negligible in manu-
facturing and rather considerable in the market services
sector.
Based on manufacturing ULC, domestic firms’ competi-
tiveness has improved steadily this year. The main
underlying reasons for this include a shift in the forint’s
exchange rate band and the subsequent nominal
exchange rate depreciation. This is, however, a tempo-
rary phenomenon as in the longer term the real exchange
rate—thus external competitiveness—depends on domes-
tic price and wage cost developments.
With the technical assumption that the nominal
exchange rate is constant, ULC should determine com-
petitiveness in 2004. As domestic ULC dynamics is pro-
jected to lag somewhat behind that of foreign trading
partners, competitiveness is expected to improve
already next year, though only slightly. Our projection is
for a rise of 1.3% and 0.2% in 2004 and 2005, respec-
tively, in domestic manufacturing competitiveness.
Chart 3-12
Productivity, wages and profits in market services*
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Chart 3-13
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Chart 3-14
Price-based real effective exchange rate 
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Nominal exchange rate movement has also improved
price-based competitiveness over the past period. Due
to domestic inflation in excess of inflation in the non-
resident sector, price-based competitiveness is expect-
ed to deteriorate gradually from Q4 onwards, amount-
ing to a total of approximately 6% over a two-year
period.
4 MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS
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As Hungary is a small country with an open capital mar-
ket, developments in the global economy affect its eco-
nomic performance considerably. The Hungarian econ-
omy has become an integral part of the European econ-
omy through foreign trade and other forms of real econ-
omy co-operation. Due to close integration, develop-
ments in money and capital market rates in the euro
area have a significant impact on both yields on domes-
tic investments and the forint exchange rate. Euro yields
are basically affected by the ECB’s anticipated interest
rate policy, which is currently greatly influenced by the
outlook for the business cycle in Europe. Economic per-
formance in Europe remains flat. Recovery is only likely
to be experienced after the US economy and other
overseas economies have started to pick up.
The growth outlook has improved in both the USA and
Asia over the past few months. Brighter expectations in
the USA can be attributed to improving indicators of
profitability in the corporate sector. Cautious optimism
may be justified by the fact that the corporate sector
has managed to reduce excess capacity and the debts
that it had incurred during the previous upswing in the
business cycle. Such optimistic outlook is overshad-
owed by the fact that restructuring has added to unem-
ployment and subdued investment activity. Nevertheless,
business confidence has strengthened. Outstanding US
Q3 GDP data (7.2%, preliminary) disclosed on 30
October further boosted the growth outlook. Expectations
of a rise in interest rates heightened, longer-term inter-
est rates rose and the prices of traded shares, mainly in
Europe, increased. The improving outlook has, howev-
er, failed to spur on the Federal Reserve to change its
monetary policy stance. Consequently, its key policy
rate remains unchanged.
In the euro area, the economy barely scraped together
0.5% growth in 2003 H1. Moderate growth was main-
ly sustained by the increase in government deficit and
an increased stock of inventories, and reduced by pri-
vate consumption, investment and net exports. Both
weak consumer confidence and inadequate demand
for exports from Europe, owing to the lengthy sluggish-
ness in global recovery, hindered growth. The lack of
aggregate demand and a strong euro also put a brake
on economic performance. Business cycle indexes in
Europe suggests a moderate recovery in 2003 H2. The
strength of the recovery, however, is still rather unpre-
dictable.
Given these uncertainties surrounding the business
cycle, it is hardly surprising that until October market
participants still did not anticipate a rise in ECB rates for
another few months. But a mid-summer increase in
long-term euro yields suggests a possible reversal in the
interest rate cycle over the longer term, which may well
be 2004 H2. Outstanding US GDP data have boosted
European bond yields. In October, there were signs of
market expectations of an approximately 0.5% raise in
interest rates by the ECB in the next 6 months. In
response to improving outlook, traded prices at stock
exchanges in Europe rose more rapidly and substantial-
ly than in the USA.
The rise in long-term yields early in the summer was not
confined to the euro area. In mid-June, a slightly better
outlook for the business cycle triggered a general wave
of rises in long-term yields in the capital markets of
advanced economies: first in Japan, then in the USA
and finally in Europe. Markets responded to economic
news rather asymmetrically: news of improving growth
outlook enhanced expectations of interest rate rises
promptly, whereas negative news with an almost iden-
tical amount of weight attached hardly affected interest
rate expectations. Overall, yields continue to be at his-
torical lows. Markets, however, are focussing on the
anticipated start of a cycle of interest rate rises.
Accordingly, expectations have become more volatile.
Global risk appetite has grown, while risk indicators
have changed slightly for the better since the August
Report. The credit rating of some emerging markets
(e.g. Brazil and Russia) has improved. Low interest rates
in advanced economies have also boosted non-resident
investments. A number of observers point out, howev-
er, that an as yet uncertain turning point in the interest
rate cycle expected to emerge in advanced economies
in 2004 H2 may alter the investment climate that cur-
rently favours emerging economies.
Global improvement in the risk perception of emerging
economies, however, has been accompanied with dete-
4.1 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RISK PERCEPTION
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riorating risk perception of this region. In September,
serious doubts were raised as to the feasibility of the
2004 budget in Poland, which in turn led to the zloty’s
significant depreciation in mid-September. Other coun-
tries in the region also face difficulties in the near future,
which adds to uncertainties surrounding exchange rates
and results in increased risk perception of the region.
Growing uncertainties led Fitch credit rating agency to
put a negative outlook on Hungarian debt in mid-July.
On 4 November, leaving its ratings for Hungary and
Poland unchanged, the agency changed its negative
outlook on the FX debt of the other seven accession
countries to a positive outlook. On 5 November,
Standard & Poor’s put a negative outlook on Poland’s
debt in zloty. The news of the Yukos affair broke on 25
October has further worsened the risk perception of the
region.
Modification in the forint’s intervention band in early
June and information on the Government’s proposal
for next year’s budget disclosed in July affected the
risk perception of Hungarian economy adversely.
Market participants were somewhat disappointed by
the fiscal consolidation plan with increased tax rev-
enues rather than expenditure cuts as its top priority.
News of developments in the current account, espe-
cially the announcement of a higher-than-expected
government deficit in mid-October, also sent a nega-
tive message.
Spread on Hungarian FX-denominated sovereign bonds
has increased somewhat since the August Report. This
may be attributed in part to increased euro yields, but
even more importantly to uncertainties surrounding
Hungary’s economic outlook.
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Chart 4-3
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Chart 4-2
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Between early August and mid-October the forint
exchange rate slowly appreciated and was more stable
than in June and July. What points to the fragility of the
relevant developments is that indicators signalling
market-uncertainties started to increase again in
September. Exchange rate appreciation, ongoing from
August, also came to a halt. Turbulence in the bond
market at end-October had further negative effects on
the exchange rate developments. Short-term rates
were mainly subject to expectations of our interest
rate decisions. Our communication and exchange rate
developments played a major role in shaping such
expectations.
As described in the August Report, the forint exchange
rate was rather volatile and weaker than the fluctuation
band that we consider as favourable. The reason for this
is that the shift in the band in June 2003 added to uncer-
tainties as to the exchange rate that economic policy
wants to sustain. The fact that, as investors put it, gen-
eral government and current account deficits were fur-
ther causes of concern may also have contributed to
the weakening of the forint exchange rate.
In its Statement attached to the August Report, the
Monetary Council expressed its intention to raise inter-
est rates if the forint exchange rate were permanently
weaker than EUR/HUF 260. Immediately after the pub-
lication of the August Report, the exchange rate started
to appreciate from a HUF/EUR 261 level. This was fur-
thered by several statements by the MNB and the
Government to the effect that the exchange rate that
they considered as favourable was EUR/HUF 250–260.
On several occasions the MNB announced that in order
to deliver its objectives it would welcome an exchange
rate stabilised in the stronger half of the EUR/HUF
250–260 band.
The exchange rate appreciation may also be brought
about by a growing consensus among market partici-
pants that the announced exchange rate band of
EUR/HUF 250–260 was roughly the one in which the
Government intends to establish the central parity in
ERM II. The ‘average respondent’ of the Reuters busi-
ness survey has been expecting the central parity in
ERM II to materialise around EUR/HUF 250–260.30
Market participants are also confident that ERM II entry
will have taken place by January 2005 at the latest.
There were, however, both external and internal fac-
tors that curbed exchange rate appreciation. Investors
continue to express their concerns about the current
accounts as well as the 2003 and 2004 budget
deficits, which affect the former. The fact that budget-
ary adjustment in 2004 is based primarily on increas-
ing revenues may raise certain doubts in investors as
to the feasibility of further adjustment needed for con-
vergence. External factors representing risks to the
appreciation of the forint include the zloty’s 6% depre-
ciation in September.
The fragility of appreciation is underpinned by the fact
that although the forint had appreciated to EUR/HUF
4.2 SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES AND EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS
Chart 4-4
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30 In August, Reuters surveyed 37 international banks and financial institutions on the expected process of convergence in the Visegrád countries. On the
basis of the survey, the central parity of the ERM II is expected to stand at EUR/HUF 260 on average. Based on the Reuters monthly surveys, both
Hungarian and foreign analysts expected an entry exchange rate of EUR/HUF 255–256 and EUR/HUF 252 on average in September and October,
respectively.
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253 by mid-October, uncertainties surrounding it start-
ed to grow already from September. Implied volatility in
the prices of FX options also corroborates this. Implied
volatility signalling uncertainties surrounding the
exchange rate fell in August over every horizon. Decline
in uncertainties came to a halt in September and start-
ed to increase over both 1-week and 1-year horizon.
Following the bond market turbulence at end-October,
both short-term and long-term implied volatilities
showed a substantial increase.
In mid-October, the exchange rate itself weakened,
leaving the stronger half of the EUR/HUF 250–260
exchange rate band. The higher-than-expected current
account deficit and regional uncertainties are most like-
ly to have contributed to depreciation. The Reuters sur-
vey in October, however, suggests that market analysts
found it transient: relative to what was projected in earli-
er surveys, only minor changes occurred in the exchange
rate projected for December 2003 and December
2004, respectively.
On 20 October, the Bank and the Government formal-
ly announced their joint 2005 target of 4% with a toler-
ance band of ±1%. Though it left the market broadly
unaffected, the announcement caught market partici-
pants somewhat unawares as they had been expecting
a slightly lower inflation target.
Loss in investors’ confidence in late October caused by
Polish bond sales prior to 24 October and the news of
the Yukos scandal dampened non-residents’ earlier
stronger interest in Hungarian sovereign bonds, as
experienced at the 30 October auction. As a result,
yields also plummeted. On 31 October a wave of sales
on the secondary government securities market and,
due to the lack of buying interest, a dramatic increase in
yields were experienced, which the MNB found funda-
mentally unjustified. In a rapid response to the liquidity
shortage in the market, the Bank entered the secondary
market, purchasing long-dated sovereign bonds in an
open market intervention. As the initial surprise at the
unusual step wore off, the markets understood our
intention and accepted its reasoning. After the attenua-
tion of the liquidity shortage, yields started to fall on 3
November.
The turbulence in the bond market at end-October has
also affected the forint exchange rate, which further
depreciated, standing at EUR/HUF 262 on 3 November.
In return, market participants, relying on earlier announce-
ments by the Bank, anticipated an immediate raise in
the official interest rate. This, concurrently with the
open market operation and the consolidation of the
bond market, led to the appreciation of the forint’s
exchange rate. By 7 November, it had appreciated to
EUR/HUF 257.
In the quarter under review the Bank maintained its
base rate at 9.5% in order to achieve the preferred
exchange rate levels. The MNB’s key policy instrument
offered significantly higher (7.5%) yield than the ECB’s
key instrument. The MNB has reaffirmed on several
occasions that it rules out an interest rate cut before the
forint exchange rate becomes permanently stable at a
level it deems as favourable.
The difference between the two-week rate and the
yield on three-month government securities gives
indication of whether market participants expect
interest rate changes in a 3-month period to come.
Market participants’ conduct suggests that they found
monetary policy-related announcements credible,
and did not anticipate any interest rate cut before the
forint exchange rate stood at EUR/HUF 250–255.
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Expectations of an interest rate cut only heightened
considerably when the forint appreciated to EUR/HUF
255 in mid-September. But the Monetary Council’s
statement on 22 September 200331 dampened expec-
tations of an interest rate cut, which were further
reduced by a weaker exchange rate in early October.
The depreciation of the forint at end-October—in line
with the earlier announcements of the Bank—resulted
in a build-up of expectations of an official rate-increase.
These expectations became substantial, when the
exchange rate crossed the EUR/HUF 260 limit on 3
November.
Relative to the information that can be gleaned from the
yield curve, the Reuters survey of the expectation of inter-
est rate cuts show a somewhat different picture. A survey
involving market analysts reveals that, as early as the
August Report came out, analysts put off the date of the
next interest rate cut. Later this date was further put off.
Yields on one-year treasury bills fell from 4.1% in July to
3.1% in October in real terms, and are below the
2000–2002 average (3.6%). Such decline was brought
about by the rise of inflation expectations in excess of
the one-year nominal interest rate increase. 
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Chart 4-8
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31 In its statement the Monetary Council expressed its opinion that, despite market expectations of an impending interest rate cut, they key policy rate
should be lowered only when the exchange rate became permanently stable in the stronger half of the HUF 250–260 band.
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In the first two months of 2003 Q3, the current account
deficit continued to grow: it amounted to over HUF
200 billion. As direct capital outflow has continued to
be significant, this item failed to contribute to deficit
financing. In July, companies converted part of their
domestic and foreign exchange credits into forints (HUF
140 billion).
While demand for equities was scarce in the two
months under review (HUF 16 billion), once again non-
resident bond investors purchased significant amounts
of Hungarian government securities (HUF 211 billion).
Thus, subsequent to the June sales, non-residents’ total
holdings increased again. The average time to maturity
of government securities in non-resident hands is still
rather long: it is around 3.5 years. However, as the
average time to maturity has noticeably declined since
June, it is worth examining portfolio changes in terms
of the maturity profile, as it is essential to see whether
the decrease in the average time to maturity is due to
a powerful influx of capital into short-term securities.
This could increase the exposure of the forint exchange
rate to the fluctuation of capital flows.
Both prior and subsequently to the June 2003 shift in
the exchange rate band, non-resident investors altered
their government securities purchasing strategy. In a
breakdown by times to maturity and relative to the port-
folio in January, cumulative changes in non-residents’
portfolio indicate that the rapid portfolio increase was
due primarily to demand for medium-term and longer-
term securities. Non-resident holdings of short-term
securities decreased significantly. As a result, the aver-
age time to maturity continued to increase. 
Subsequently, the increase in the average time to maturi-
ty of government securities stopped and then started to
decline. This drop may be attributed to the fact that since
4.3 CAPITAL FLOWS
Table 4-1
Components of foreign exchange market demand and supply (HUF billions)*
2002 2003
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 July August
I. Current Account –117 –176 –70 –306 –207 –386 –108 –104
II. Capital Account 13 15 6 13 –25 2 –1 2,6
III. Direct investment (excluding revenues from privatisation) 27 80 19 28 –164 –53 –61 –75
IV. Demand for forints arising from conversion 60 –62 26 –40 87 2 –23 4
of domestic foreign currency deposits
1. Companies 25 –70 13 –41 62 –15 –30 5
2. Households 35 8 13 0 24 17 8 –1
V. Net portfolio investments (1+2+3) 217 11 113 350 295 109 149 63
1. Government securities 144 33 236 310 177 56 127 84
2. Equities 14 –16 –25 –36 48 16 7 9
3. Forint deposits 59 –7 –98 76 70 37 15 –30
VI. Corporate foreign currency credit (1+2) –230 –182 –167 –79 19 139 140 3
1. Domestic 45 55 70 –23 95 74 46 –14
2. Foreign –275 –237 –237 –56 –75 66 94 17
VII. Net forint demand of other credit institutions 26 119 114 138 45 87 33 22
VIII. Other 11 125 28 152 92 114 14 40
IX. Net demand for forints of participants 7 –70 68 256 142 49 142 –46
outside the banking sector (I. + II. + … + VIII.)
X. Change in banks' on-balance-sheet long forint positions –7 70 –68 –256 371 –288 –142 46
XI. Net central bank intervention (IX. + X.) 0 0 0 0 513 –238 0 0
* Positive values represent forint demand and negative figures mean forint supply. The central bank's intervention (XI.) is an exception to this rule,
as the situation is just the reverse: positive values stand for sales.
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August non-resident investors have shown increasing
demand for securities with a 2-4 year time to maturity,
whereas there is no perceptible trend of change in any of
the other maturity brackets, whether longer or shorter.
For this reason, it may be established that the mere short-
ening of the portfolio should not be deemed as indicative
of the predominance of short-term investors and long-
term investors biding their time. Rather, the increase in
holdings is a result of a massive rise in demand for medi-
um-term bonds which on average mature slightly earlier
than the securities outstanding in the market.
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Chart 4-10
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Movements in long-term yields are influenced by
domestic market participants’ inflation expectations.
However, foreign investors, with a dominant share of
the forint-denominated bond market, compare long-
term yields with movements in euro yields, the expect-
ed change in the forint exchange rate and required risk
premium. The discussion below traces movements in
the forint yield curve beyond one year to variations in
the factors noted above.
Longer-term (at least one-year) forint-denominated gov-
ernment securities yields changed little in the period
between early September and end-October. Here, the
ten-year benchmark yield fell 30 basis points in the sec-
ond part of September; however, it rose above 7% by
the second part of October. Movements in long-term
forint-denominated bond yields were broadly aligned
with those in long-term euro and dollar yields. How-
ever, the variations in yields experienced in the three
months under review were not significant and, conse-
quently, they do not suggest considerable changes in
long-term inflation expectations or the risk premium.
Due to inadequate liquidity in the market, the wave of
bond sales witnessed at end-October led to a consider-
able rise in long-term yields, amplified by stop-loss sell-
ing. Between 29–31 October, 3- and 5-year govern-
ment securities yields surged by 120–130 basis points.
A jump in yields of similar magnitude has not been seen
in the market for several years.
In the Monetary Council’s view, the rise in yields was
mainly attributable to technical factors, instead of a sig-
nificant change in expectations. Accordingly, it attempt-
ed to channel market developments toward equilibri-
um by open market operations, which meant buying
5- and 10-year bonds, instead of raising official interest
rates. As a result of the intervention, long-term yields
fell 50-80 basis points, depending on maturity. The
market appeared to have stabilised by 6 November,
although at a higher level of long-term yields relative to
that characteristic in period preceding the selling wave:
5-, 10- and 15-year benchmark yields were 30-40 basis
points higher and the 3-year yield nearly 90 basis
points higher than the level in period before 29
October.
The shift in the zero-coupon yield curve is evidence of
falls in required yields across the entire maturity spec-
trum in the period early August–end-October. At nearly
40 basis points, that fall was the largest at the 4 to 5-
year maturities. The ten-year zero-coupon yield fell 20
basis points in the same period. However, the end-
4.4 LONG-TERM YIELDS AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Chart 4-11
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October events shifted the yield curve upward again,
which stood higher than its level in early August, even
after the central bank intervention and consolidation of
the market. At 60-70 basis points, the difference was
largest in the 1- to 3-year maturity bracket.
It can be inferred from the shift in the implied forward
curve that a 30–40 basis point drop in interest rate
expectations at the 1- to 4-year horizon may have been
responsible for the slight yield drop which occurred up
to end-October. The permanent part of the yield rise
occurring at end-October to early November, can be
attributed to the deterioration in expectations related to
the 0–2 years horizon.
Meanwhile, the euro yield curve also shifted upwards.
Consequently, the forward differential between the
forint and the euro rose by only 40–60 basis points at
1–2 years and it fell by only 40–50 basis points at 3–6
years. If we interpret implied forward rates as interest
rate expectations related to various future points in time,
it should be taken into account that the rate expected
for the same point (e.g. 2 years ahead) corresponded to
different points of the forward curve in August than in
November (to August 2005 and November 2005,
respectively). Taking account of the 3-month shift in the
curves, the rise in the short end of the curve is even
more pronounced (80–100 basis points at 2 years, i.e.
for 2005); however, the fall experienced at 3–6 years
was only 25–35 basis points. Consequently, expecta-
tions for the forint-euro interest rate differential deterio-
rated considerably at the shorter horizon, and improved
slightly for the date of EMU entry (2006–2009). It should
be noted that the purchases by the MNB of 5- and 10-
year bonds may have had an impact on the yield curve
at the segment between 3–4 and 10 years and, conse-
quently, it may not be a reliable reflection of market
expectations for the corresponding days.
The survey of analysts’ expectations conducted by
Reuters may provide a picture of expectations attached
to inflation and the likely entry by Hungary into EMU,
often influencing long-term yields. However, this only
provides information about analysts’ inflation expecta-
tions for end-2003 and end-2004. In July, analysts
expected inflation to be 4.9% on average in December
2003. In October, they raised their average expectation
to 5.1%, which remained within the margin of error. In
respect of end-2004, the market consensus increased
much more significantly, from 4.3% to 5.5%. This
broadly amounted to the inflationary impact, which
could be anticipated on account of the planned changes
to indirect taxes.
If it was inflation expectations for 2004 that caused the
rise in the 1- to 2-year segment of the forward curve,
this would mean that, in the market’s view, monetary
policy wishes to offset this additional inflation caused by
indirect taxes. However, the Monetary Council indicat-
ed that it targeted inflation of below 5.5%, i.e. it regards
this a factor beyond its control which it would not
attempt to neutralise by tightening monetary condi-
tions. Assuming that the announcement was credible
for the market (as market reactions suggested), this
effect could not be reflected in nominal interest rates or
interest rate expectations.
The November poll contained forecasts for end-2005,
the average of which was 3.6%. However, no informa-
tion is available on analysts’ expectations at the end of
the summer, so the trend of expectations for this hori-
zon remained unknown for Bank staff. Consequently,
the Reuters poll provided little evidence, which could
have confirmed that the yield rise was caused by infla-
tion expectations.
Exchange rate expectations changed slightly towards
appreciation in the period between the July and
October surveys—the average exchange rate expected
for end-2004 changed from 254 to 250. However, the
spot exchange rate rose more strongly between the two
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dates, so the expected appreciation actually drifted
lower and therefore it does not provide explanation for
the slight drop in yields which occurred up to mid-
October.
Forecasts for the central parity in ERM II can be a proxy
for longer-term exchange rate expectations, as it is a
very likely value of an ultimate conversion rate to be
determined at the time of EMU entry. Whereas analysts
in a large international sample of a Reuters survey con-
ducted in August expected a EUR/HUF 260 central par-
ity on average, in the regular Hungarian poll32 in
October all analysts expected the central rate in ERM II
to be in the 250-260 range, with an average of 252.4. If
this can be treated as informative in terms of longer-
term expectations, expectations of an exchange rate
appreciation are little changed, given the similar rise in
the spot exchange rate.
A higher risk premium required by investors may also
explain the rise in yields. Global investor sentiment
improved in the period under review,33 which may have
justified opposite movements in yields. Meanwhile, the
region’s risk perception worsened (Polish fiscal problems,
the Yukos affair, etc.). The actions by large international
rating agencies, already noted, also suggest that investors
perceive greater uncertainties in respect of Hungary and
Poland. If the rise in yields was indeed caused by the
increase in the risk premium, then it deserves mention
that, at least in the case of Hungary, this did not materi-
ally affect expectations attached to EMU entry. This is
indicated by the fact that the premium of implied forward
rates over the corresponding euro forward rates only
rose in the maturity segment corresponding to the period
up to 2005–2006. Implied forward rates mostly fell in the
segment relating to the period after 2008, the earliest
technically plausible entry-date.
The Reuters poll also contains analysts’ responses to the
question concerning the most likely date of Hungary’s
EMU entry, which painted a somewhat more pes-
simistic picture. None of the analysts has indicated
dates later than 2010 in response to the question asked
regularly since January. During 2003, the average of the
dates considered to be the most likely has shifted grad-
ually from 2008, characteristic in the early months of
the year, to 2009. This tendency has been mildly char-
acteristic of the past three months, even if the monthly
changes were statistically insignificant. Whereas in the
June and July polls analysts about equally expected
2008 and 2009 as the most likely date of entry, in
September–October the majority voted for 2009.
Based on the information discussed above, it is difficult
to explain the slight drop in long-term yields in August-
October; however, the portion of the rise in yields at
end-October to early November which appeared to be
lasting can be traced to the increase in risk premium
required by investors. The higher perceived risk
stemmed mainly from region and country-specific
sources, relates to the next 2–3 years, and is unlikely to
be connected with the slight shift in expectations
attached to EMU entry. Inflation and exchange rate
expectations had little impact on movements in yields in
the period under review.
Chart 4-16
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32 Which means a different sample.
33 For more details, see the International environment section.
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The CSO disclosed data, still preliminary, on GDP in 2002
for the second time on 21 October 2003. These revised
data show higher growth in 2002 both on the output and
the uses side than the original. Below we show the differ-
ence between the two data releases more in detail.
Please note, that only revised annual data were pub-
lished. A detailed quarterly breakdown of the production
and uses side is only to be published on 19 December.
There being no quarterly data, we were unable to
update our projection. As a result, such data will only be
incorporated in our next Report in February 2004.
It should also be noted that before the data revision it
was difficult to provide a consistent picture of last year’s
macroeconomic developments. Departure from earlier
data can be identified at several junctures that are in
keeping with our assumptions. Annual data published
recently are based on detailed budgetary and corporate
data. Production and uses side data have been revised
considerably. Corporate tax returns having been
processed, manufacturing added value is substantially
higher than previously disclosed.
On the uses side, data on exports and imports remained
unchanged. Based on detailed budgetary data, the
index of social transfers in-kind and public consumption
is markedly higher than earlier projected. Data on fixed
capital formation has been corrected upwards based on
its projection for the sectoral distribution of investment.
We conclude that upward correction can be mainly
attributed to a slight decline in corporate investment.
Data on nominal GDP have also changed: compared to
what was first disclosed there has been a downward
modification in these data, owing to changes in defla-
tors. In terms of quantification, changes in nominal GDP
have barely affected the 2002 current account deficit as
a proportion of GDP, amounting to 4%, calculated with
the inclusion of the relevant new data. However, gen-
eral government deficit in 2002 as a proportion of GDP
is 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points higher.
One of the special topics in Section 5 of the November
2002 Report addressed the issue of GDP data revision
policies. The reason was that the uses side suggested
higher GDP data in 2002 H1 than did the production
side. The current revision of 2002 data corroborates our
earlier assumption regarding upward revision of data.
In accordance with international practice, the CSO
revises GDP data in the first preliminary disclosure on a
number of occasions. According to the current practice,
earlier data generally remain unrevised when within-
year data are published in the reference period. Within-
year quarterly data are, however, revised on the basis of
annual data. The preliminary annual GDP data are first
5.1 REVISED DATA ON GDP IN 2002
Table 5-1
The original versus the revised data for 2002*
(Percentage annual increase in the volume index)
Original data Revised data Difference
(recent-earlier 
data, in
percentage points)
Uses side**
Household 
consumption 8.8 9.4 0.6
Household
consumption
expenditure 10.2 10.5 0.3
Social transfers
in-kind 3.0 4.9 1.9
Public consumption 1.5 5.0 3.5
Fixed capital formation 5.8 7.2 1.4
Exports 3.8 3.8 0.0
Imports 6.1 6.1 0.0
Production side (value added)**
Industry 0.4 1.0 0.6
manufacturing 1.1 2.8 1.7
Market services 4.1 5.1 1.0
GDP 3.3 3.5 0.2
Nominal GDP
GDP in bn HUF 16,981 16,744 –1.4%
* Source: CSO.
** Average annual volume indices.
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disclosed 3 to 4 months after the reference quarter is
over. Then, revised data are published on another two
occasions. The second preliminary disclosure occurs 10
months after a rapid processing of income tax returns.
The third disclosure, which includes final data calculat-
ed on the basis of correlation tests, occurs 16 months
after the reference period.
We studied the CSO’s revision policy as to how prelim-
inary data differ from final ones. The results suggest that
subsequent annual data revision is less significant than
quarterly data revision. The first revision of 2002 data
has been included in the chart showing annual data. It
reveals that, relative to the past years, an upward revi-
sion of 0.2 percentage point of 2002 data is not
marked.
Chart 5-1
Preliminary annual GDP growth rates and revisions*
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The following is a summary of frequently asked ques-
tions by analysts and experts about the recording of
reinvested earnings in financial accounts. Our answers
to such questions shed light on how reinvested earnings
are recorded under the new methodology applied in
the compilation of the balance of payments to be pub-
lished on 31 March 2004.
– How can data on reinvested earnings to be pub-
lished as of 2004 be derived from financial
accounts?
The recording of reinvested earnings affects two instru-
ments in financial accounts: ‘Shares and other equities’
and ‘Other receivables/accounts payable’.
The rest-of-the world data on the former is the sum of
the entries under ‘Equity securities’ in the portfolio
investments of the balance of payments and ‘Shares
and other equity interests’ in direct capital investment
(including that part of the earnings which has not been
distributed as dividend, i.e. reinvested earnings).
Approved, but undistributed dividend (i.e. distributed
earnings) is (are) recorded under ‘Other receivables/
accounts payable’ and ‘Other capital flows’ within
‘Direct capital investment’ in the financial accounts
and the balance of payments respectively. The finan-
cial accounts provide data from the rest-of-the world
perspective, whereas the balance of payments from
Hungary’s. Thus, what is recorded in the financial
accounts as accounts payable in the rest-of-the world
column is residents’ debts vis-à-vis the rest of the
world.
The table below compares the two types of statistics in
respect of one aspect (‘Residents’ debts vis-à-vis the rest
of the world’) of one instrument (‘Shares and other equi-
ty interests’), revealing it is the recording of reinvested
earnings that causes the difference in the two values
included in the two types of statistics. Accordingly, com-
parison can also be made in respect of the other aspect
(‘Residents’ receivables from the rest of the world’) as
well as the other instruments (‘Other receivables/
accounts payable’). Note that unlike the balance of pay-
ments, financial accounts do not separate direct capital
investment from portfolio investments on the basis of
ownership share (10%).
– The recording of reinvested earnings affects data on
direct investment stocks. Can data on foreign direct
investment stocks be obtained from stock data
included in financial data?
No data on direct investment stocks can be obtained
from stock data included in financial data, since direct
5.2 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: RECORDING OF REINVESTED EARNINGS
Transactions affecting equities based on the balance of payments and the financial accounts 
(2003 Q2, HUF billions)
Financial accounts/Financial instruments/The rest of the world Balance of payments/Financial account/Liabilities
Including reinvested earnings Excluding reinvested earnings
Shares and other equities Portfolio investments
Quoted shares 14.7 10.7 Equity securities 
Unquoted shares –14.1 Direct investment
Of which: reinvested earnings –6.1 48.0 Shares and other ownership shares in Hungary 
Holdings 54.1
Of which: reinvested earnings 2.5
Investment fund units 0.2
Total 55.0 58.6 Total
Of which: reinvested earnings –3.6 0.0 Of which: reinvested earnings
Total excluding reinvested earnings 58.6 58.6 Total excluding reinvested earnings
Table 5-2
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capital investment and portfolio investments separat-
ed in the balance of payments statistics on the basis of
investors’ participating interests cannot be separated
in either financial accounts, or their source of data, i.e.
the database of APEH TÁSA (corporate income tax).
Such data can only be obtained directly from business
surveys.34 
The table below shows the differences in stocks.35 
– To what extent are the individual entries in the balance
of payments to be published in 2004 likely to change,
owing to the recording of reinvested earnings?
In order that earnings related to ownership share in
direct capital investment can be recorded, the following
data must be had:
(i) the amount of the after-tax earnings (profit or loss) of
non-resident investors’ enterprises in Hungary and
resident investors’ enterprises abroad as well as the
years in which they are reported (made or incurred);
(ii) the authorisation by owners of the amount and dis-
bursement date of dividend; 
(iii) the amount of related dividend tax;
(iv) the date of the actual disbursement of dividend (in
a lump sum or instalments).
(i) The investor’s after-tax earnings (profit or loss) must
be recorded as reinvested earnings in the balance of
the payments for the year in which they are actually
reported. Data on such earnings can only be
obtained several months after the relevant business
year is over. (As currently, the vast majority of com-
panies prepare their respective reports in late May,
the deadline for business surveys to arrive is adjusted
to this practice and is slated for late June). After busi-
ness surveys are processed, data are included in the
balance of payments in the final months of the year
following the reference one. 
(ii) Dividend must be included in income during the
period when owners authorise the payment of such.
(iii) When owners authorise the distribution of after-tax
profit, investors must pay dividend tax to the state
on the amount of the dividend authorised. 
(iv) The actual sum of dividend is the amount of the divi-
dend authorised less the dividend tax deducted.
Thus, in contrast to current practice, when dividend
is paid, no current account entry is involved. Both
legs of the transaction only involve the balance of
payments. 
The methodological switch from the cash basis to
accrual accounting for income affects the balance of
the current account. Unlike accounting for income
related to portfolio and other investments, where, in
effect, both cash basis and accrual basis accounting
leads to differences in the time distribution of a given
value (the amount of annual interest is recorded on
on-going basis or as a lump sum), and, as a result, the
manner of accounting leaves the balance of the cur-
The value of ownership share stocks based non-residents' investment position and the financial
accounts (30 June 2003, HUF billions)
Financial accounts/Rest of the world/Liabilities Non-residents' investment position/Liabilities 
stock vis-a-vis the rest of the world
Including reinvested earnings Excluding reinvested earnings
Shares and other equity 8,896.1 6,507.3 Total
Quoted shares 2,152.6 Portfolio investments
Unquoted shares 2,713.9 930.7 Equity securities
Holdings 4,018.3 Direct capital investment
Mutual fund shares 11.4 5,576.6 Shares and other equity in Hungary
Table 5-3
34 While APEH data are used to account for non-resident owners’ receivables in the financial accounts, in the case of both direct + capital investment and
portfolio shares, stock data cumulated on the basis of turnover are used in stock statistics related to the balance of payments (non-resident investment
position) before disclosure at the year-end 2003. As a result, stock data cannot be compared with each other. Nor can they be derived from each other.
From 2004, working capital stocks will be recorded in the balance of payments on the basis of the results of surveys on direct capital investment, com-
plemented with APEH data from corporate tax returns.
35 The table showing stock data compares the two types of statistics in respect of one aspect (‘Shares and other equity interests’) of one instrument
(‘Residents’ debts vis-à-vis the rest of the world’), comparison in this case denoting the differences between the two types. Accordingly, comparison
can also be made in respect of the other aspect (‘Residents’ receivables from the rest of the world’) as well as the other instruments (‘Other receiv-
ables/accounts payable’).
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rent account unaffected considering the entire period,
both cash basis and accrual accounting for direct cap-
ital investment records different values at different
intervals.
– For which periods are reinvested earnings in the
current account to be published in 2004 based on
factual data and for which periods are they based
on estimates? What revision policies are adopted in
data disclosure? When can data be considered
final?
In 1999, in agreement with the CSO, the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank introduced its business survey regime in
order to monitor firms’ direct capital investment and for
working capital transactions to be recorded. Reinvested
earnings constitute the most important of all such trans-
actions.
The data included in the balance of payments to be
published in 2004 go as far back as 1995.
The after-tax profit and the amount of authorised divi-
dend of non-residents’ direct investment in Hungary as
well as the stock value of direct capital investment are
estimates based on APEH TÁSA data for 1995–1998.
Data on both income and stocks in the balance of pay-
ments to be published next year are based on the
results of questionnaire surveys going back as far as
end-1998.
The deadline for working capital surveys on the refer-
ence year’s profit is 30 June following the reference
year. After the surveys are processed, data are included
in the balance of payments in the final months of the
year following the reference one.
Estimates of the after-tax component of reinvested earn-
ings are included in balance of payments statistics for
the reference year and the year that follows it. At the
end of the year following the year under review, after
surveys are processed, the estimated after-tax profit in
the balance of payments for the reference year and the
estimated authorised dividend for the year following the
reference one are replaced with preliminary actual data
derived from the results of the relevant surveys.
On the whole, estimated data for 1995 to late 1998, final
survey data, complemented with TÁSA ones for late
1998 to 2001, preliminary actual data (to be revised next
year when final 2002 TÁSA data are published), comple-
mented with TÁSA ones for 2002 are used to assess both
components of reinvested earnings to be published on
31 March 2004. The MNB provides estimates for the
2003 after-tax profit, and survey data are used to calcu-
late authorised dividend. Both 2004 after-tax profit and
authorised dividend feature as estimated data.
78 MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
5 SPECIAL TOPICS
5
A good measure of the capital stock is important in
order to be able to perform economic analyses from a
number of aspects.36 Production function approxima-
tions, generally used to determine supply and potential
output, take, in addition to labour, capital stocks as pro-
duction input into consideration. Academic literature
on economic development pays special attention to
how the individual factors of production (i.e. labour,
capital and technologies) contribute to economic
growth. Recent dynamic global growth in economic
productivity (the new economy) has yet again under-
scored the importance of analysing capital stocks, and
IT-based capital stocks, in particular.
In recent years, there have been attempts to provide
estimates for the net capital stock in Hungary. When
preparing its analyses in 1999, the IMF relied on the
CSO’s capital stock statistics published before 1991.37
However, these statistics were skewed upwards, for
only investment recently included in the stock had been
properly deflated. In order to compensate for these
shortcomings, Darvas and Simon (2000) derived esti-
mates for the initial level of the capital stock from a pro-
duction function.38
Our recently developed procedure for providing esti-
mates is based on two recent data disclosures by the
CSO.39 In late 2002, as a first step of a long-term proj-
ect, the CSO published the results of a questionnaire
survey on the stock of corporate assets. Furthermore, it
also compiled a historic time series of investment,
which, in a detailed breakdown of sectors and assets as
well as in a uniform methodological approach, includes
whole-economy investment spanning several decades.
The use of these two sources of data resulted in mate-
rially different results: the net (i.e. gross capital less
depreciation) capital stock estimated with the historic
time series of investment hardly amounted to 50% of
what was calculated on the basis of the CSO survey.
Although the historic time series of investment is a less
reliable source of data, lower estimates for capital
stocks based on it are still more acceptable in interna-
tional comparison.
While calculations were made for the capital stock,
numerous problems arose which can be attributed to
the characteristics of transition economies, and which
international literature address in less detail. It is hard to
find an acceptable method of assessing the deprecia-
tion of the assets commissioned prior to the 1990s and
rendered uncompetitive by the new conditions. It is
equally hard to provide a definitive answer as to how
the length of time in service of these assets changed
during the transition and ever since. Most recent
research claims that estimates are less sensitive to
changes in the above assertions, so results can be
regarded robust despite the uncertainties surrounding
the assertions.
One of the shortcomings of the method applied is its
combined treatment of IT and other capital assets.
5.3 ESTIMATES FOR NON-RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL STOCK IN HUNGARY
Chart 5-2
Estimate for domestic net real capital stock*
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* Source: Pula (2003) estimate based on the CSO’s historic time series
of investment. Volume terms, in 1999 prices.
36 Non-residential capital refers to domestic capital excluding dwellings.
37 IMF (1999) “Hungary Selected Issues”, SM/99/28 and Doyle P, Kuijs L., Jiang G. (2001) “Real Convergence to EU Income Levels: Central Europe
from 1990 to the long term”, IMF Working Paper WP/01/146.
38 Zs. Darvas and A. Simon (2000), “Capital stock and economic development in Hungary”, Economics of Transition 8(1).
39 G. Pula  (2003), “Estimates for Hungary’s capital stock with the PIM method. Methodology and results”, MNB Working Papers 2003/7.
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Impairment of IT and telecommunications assets is
faster than that of other capital assets (their length of
time in service is shorter), which can be attributed to
highly dynamic innovation. As a result, the capital
invested in IT assets should yield a higher return than
other assets of a similar market price. This means that
the productivity of IT assets should be higher than that
of other assets.
Accordingly, when estimates are made, a separate treat-
ment of IT assets means that allowances should be
made for not only the materially higher depreciation,
but also the higher productivity of such assets. This basi-
cally amounts to quality correction in capital stocks.
VICS (volume index of capital services), though not the
most recently adopted, has been tailored exactly for
such corrective purposes. This method has only been in
use for the past couple of years.40 The essence of the
VICS method is that, in contrast with traditional
accounting for capital, it uses the rental price, rather
than the market price of assets in order to aggregate
them individually.41 The price weighted with the rental
price allows for the differences in asset productivity, so
it provides a more accurate picture of how capital
stocks contribute to production processes.
Currently, no official data on domestic IT capital are
available. Though the CSO survey to assess corporate
assets includes asset classes with rapid replacement (a
service time of 1 to 5 years), official data disclosure fails
to treat them as a separate category. The WITSA (World
Information Technology and Services Alliance) data-
base is, however, available, and provides a detailed
breakdown (software, hardware, other services and
telecommunications) of the time series of investment
for a great number of countries, including Hungary.
Data suggest that the ratio of domestic IT investment to
GDP has been in excess of EU average since 1998. In
2001, it was the highest in the region. Convergence
impact (the backwardness of IT technologies) is likely to
have played a major role in this. The pace of expansion
in IT investment suggests that the impact of IT may
become more powerful also in domestic economy in
the years to come, which adds to the pressing need for
IT-related research.
Chart 5-3
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Source: WITSA (2002) “Digital Planet 2002: The Global Information
Economy”.
40 The VICS method was first introduced by Jorgenson and Griliches in 1967 (Jorgenson, D. W. and Griliches, Z. (1967) “The explanation of productiv-
ity change”, Review of Economic Studies Vol. 34 pages 249–83). It has been rehashed in connection with IT research in recent years. In the USA,
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom (Oulton, N. and O’Mahony, M (1994) “Productivity and growth: a study of British industry 1954-1986”,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) the VICS method has been officially adopted to provide estimates for capital stocks. For a comprehensive
description of the method, see Oulton, N. and Srinivasan, S. (2003) “Capital stocks, capital services and depreciation: an integrated framework”, Bank
of England Working Papers No. 192 and OECD (2001) “Measuring capital: a manual on the measurement of capital stocks, consumption of fixed cap-
ital and capital services”, Paris: OECD, (In Hungarian: KSH (2002) “Measuring assets, OECD Manual”, International Statistical Documents 7/1)
41 If market prices are equal to the net present value of future capital service, then from between two assets of the same market price, but with different
economic lives, the one with a shorter economic life, hence with a shorter payback period, should produce higher return in one year. Accordingly, the
rent should be different, too, on the two assets: the rent on the one with a shorter economic life should be higher.
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